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secrets leading the way), this paper presents three 
legal routes that enable citizens to ‘open’ the algo-
rithms. First, copyright and patent exceptions, as well 
as trade secrets are discussed. Second, the EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation is critically assessed. 
In principle, data controllers are not allowed to use al-
gorithms to take decisions that have legal effects on 
the data subject’s life or similarly significantly affect 
them. However, when they are allowed to do so, the 
data subject still has the right to obtain human inter-
vention, to express their point of view, as well as to 
contest the decision. Additionally, the data controller 
shall provide meaningful information about the logic 
involved in the algorithmic decision. Third, this paper 
critically analyses the first known case of a court us-
ing the access right under the freedom of information 
regime to grant an injunction to release the source 
code of the computer program that implements an 
algorithm. Only an integrated approach – which takes 
into account intellectual property, data protection, 
and freedom of information – may provide the citi-
zen affected by an algorithmic decision of an effec-
tive remedy as required by the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights of the EU and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
Abstract:  This work presents ten arguments 
against algorithmic decision-making. These revolve 
around the concepts of ubiquitous discretionary in-
terpretation, holistic intuition, algorithmic bias, the 
three black boxes, psychology of conformity, power of 
sanctions, civilising force of hypocrisy, pluralism, em-
pathy, and technocracy. Nowadays algorithms can 
decide if one can get a loan, is allowed to cross a bor-
der, or must go to prison. Artificial intelligence tech-
niques (natural language processing and machine 
learning in the first place) enable private and public 
decision-makers to analyse big data in order to build 
profiles, which are used to make decisions in an auto-
mated way. The lack of transparency of the algorith-
mic decision-making process does not stem merely 
from the characteristics of the relevant techniques 
used, which can make it impossible to access the ra-
tionale of the decision. It depends also on the abuse 
of and overlap between intellectual property rights 
(the “legal black box”). In the US, nearly half a million 
patented inventions concern algorithms; more than 
67% of the algorithm-related patents were issued 
over the last ten years and the trend is increasing. To 
counter the increased monopolisation of algorithms 
by means of intellectual property rights (with trade 
Keywords:  Algorithmic decision-making; algorithmic bias; right not to be subject to an algorithmic decision; 
GDPR; software copyright exceptions; patent infringement defences; freedom of information 
request; algorithmic transparency; algorithmic accountability; algorithmic governance; 
Data Protection Act 2018
2018
Guido Noto La Diega
4 1
A. Context and scope of the research
1 This work argues that algorithms cannot and should 
not replace human beings in decision-making, but it 
takes account of the increase of algorithmic decisions 
and, accordingly, it presents three European legal 
routes available to those affected by such decisions. 
2 Algorithms have been used in the legal domain for 
decades, for instance in order to analyse legislation.1 
These processes or sets of rules followed in 
calculations or other problem-solving operations 
raised limited concerns when they merely made our 
lives easier by ensuring that search engines showed 
us only relevant results.2 However, nowadays 
algorithms can decide if one can get a loan,3 is hired,4 
is allowed to cross a border,5 or must go to prison.6 
Particularly striking is the episode concerning a 
young man sentenced in Wisconsin to a six-year 
imprisonment for merely attempting to flee a traffic 
officer and operating a vehicle without its owner’s 
consent. The reason for such a harsh sanction was 
that Compas, an algorithmic risk assessment system, 
concluded that he was a threat to the community. 
The proprietary nature of the algorithm did not 
allow the defendant to challenge the Compas report. 
The Supreme Court found no violation of the right 
to due process.7 
* Lecturer in Law (Northumbria University); Director (Ital-
IoT Centre for Multidisciplinary Research on the Internet of 
Things); Fellow (Nexa Center for Internet & Society).
1 William Adam Wilson, ‘The Complexity of Statutes’ (1974) 
37 Mod L Rev 497.
2 The algorithm used by Google to rank search results is 
covered by a trade secret.
3 More generally, on the use of algorithms to determine the 
parties’ contractual obligations, see Lauren Henry Scholz, 
‘Algorithmic Contracts’ (SSRN, 1 October 2016), <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2747701> accessed 1 March 2018.
4 On the negative spirals that automated scoring systems 
can create, to the point of making people unemployable, 
see Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, ‘The scored 
society: Due process for automated predictions’ (2014) 89(1) 
Washington Law Review 1, 33.
5 Jose Sanchez del Rio et al., ‘Automated border control 
e-gates and facial recognition systems’ (2016) 62 Computers 
& Security 49.
6 As written by Frank Pasquale, ‘Secret algorithms threaten 
the rule of law’ (MIT Technology Review, 1 June 2017) 
<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608011/secret-
algorithms-threaten-the-rule-of-law/> accessed 1 March 
2018, imprisoning people “because of the inexplicable, 
unchallengeable judgements of a secret computer program 
undermines our legal system”. For a files $10 million lawsuit 
related to face-matching technology that allegedly ruined 
an American man’s life see Allee Manning, ‘A False Facial 
Recognition Match Cost This Man Everything’ (Vocativ, 
1 May 2017) <http://www.vocativ.com/418052/false-
facial-recognition-cost-denver-steve-talley-everything/> 
accessed 1 March 2018.
7 State v Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). Cf Adam 
Liptak, ‘Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret 
3 Artificial intelligence techniques (natural language 
processing, machine learning, etc.) and predictive 
analytics enable private and public decision-makers 
to extract value from big data8 and to build profiles, 
which are used to make decisions in an automated 
way. The accuracy of the profiles is further enhanced 
by the linking capabilities of the Internet of Things.9 
These decisions may profoundly affect people’s 
lives in terms of, for instance, discrimination, de-
individualisation, information asymmetries, and 
social segregation.10 
4 In light of the confusion as to the actual role of 
algorithms, it is worrying that in “the models of game 
theory, decision theory, artificial intelligence, and 
military strategy, the algorithmic rules of rationality 
replaced the self-critical judgments of reason.”11
5 One paper12 concluded by asking whether and how 
algorithms should be regulated. This work aims to 
constitute an attempt to answer those questions with 
a focus on the existing rules on intellectual property, 
data protection, and freedom of information. In 
particular, it will be critically assessed whether “the 
tools currently available to policymakers, legislators, 
and courts (which) were developed to oversee 
human decision-makers (…) fail when applied to 
computers instead.”13
6 First, the paper presents ten arguments why 
algorithms cannot and should not replace human 
decision-makers. After this, three legal routes are 
presented.14 The General Data Protection Regulation 
Algorithms’ (New York Times, 1 May 2017), <https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-
software-programs-secret-algorithms.html?_r=0> accessed 
1 March 2018.
8 In analysing the algorithms used by social networks, 
Yoan Hermstrüwer, ‘Contracting Around Privacy: The 
(Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big Data’ 
(2017) 8(1) JIPITEC 12, observes that for these “algorithms to 
allow good predictions about personal traits and behaviors, 
the network operator needs two things: sound knowledge 
about the social graph [describing the social ties between 
users] and large amounts of data.”
9 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated 
individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes 
of Regulation 2016/679’ (2017) 17/EN WP 251.
10 See Bart W. Schermer, ‘The limits of privacy in automated 
profiling and data mining’ (2011) 27 Computer law & 
security review 45, 52, and Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 5.
11 Lorraine Daston, ‘How Reason Became Rationality’ (Max-
Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2013) <https://
www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/projects/DeptII_
Daston_Reason> accessed 1 March 2018.
12 Solon Barocas et al., ‘Governing Algorithms: A Provocation 
Piece’ (SSRN, 4 April 2013) 9 <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2245322> accessed 1 March 2018.
13 Joshua A. Kroll et al., ‘Accountable Algorithms’ (2017) 165 U 
Pa L Rev. 633.
14 Other routes may be explored. In the US, Keats Citron (n 4) 33 
suggested that the principles of due process may constitute 
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(GDPR)15 bans solely automated decisions having 
legal effects on the data subject’s life “or similarly 
significantly affects him or her.”16 However, when 
such decisions are allowed, the data controller shall 
ensure the transparency of the decision, and give the 
data subject the rights to obtain human intervention, 
to express their point of view, as well as to contest 
the decision. Data protection is the most studied 
perspective but invoking it by itself is a strategy 
that “is no longer viable.”17 Therefore, this paper 
approaches this issue by integrating data protection, 
intellectual property, and freedom of information.
7 As to the intellectual property route, some copyright 
and patent exceptions may allow the access to a 
computer program implementing an algorithm, 
notwithstanding its proprietary nature. 
8 In turn, when it comes to the freedom of information, 
an Italian court stated that an algorithm is a digital 
administrative act and therefore, under the freedom 
of information regime, the citizens have the right 
to access it.18
9 In terms of method, the main focus is a desk-based 
research of EU laws, and of the UK and Italian 
implementations. The paper is both positive and 
normative. Whilst advocating against algorithmic 
decision-making, this research adopts a pragmatic 
approach whereby one should take into account 
that the replacement of human decision-makers 
with algorithms is already happening. Therefore, it 
is important to understand how to solve the relevant 
legal issues using existing laws. If algorithms are 
becoming “weapons of math destruction,”19 it 
is crucial that awareness is raised regarding the 
pervasivity of algorithmic decision-making and that 
light is shed on the existing legal tools, in anticipation 
of better regulations and more responsible modelers. 
Without clarity on the nature of the phenomenon 
and the relevant legal tools, it is unlikely that citizens 
will trust algorithms.
a sufficient answer against algorithmic decisions (in 
particular, against automated scoring systems). The authors 
recommend that the Federal Trade Commission interrogate 
scoring systems under their unfairness authority.
15 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC [2016] OJ 119/1.
16 GDPR, art 22.
17 Schermer (n 10) 52.
18 TAR Lazio, chamber III bis, 22 March 2017, No 3769.
19 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data 
Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (Crown 2016).
B. Positive and normative 
arguments against algorithms 
as a replacement for human 
decision-makers
10 The first part of this section is dedicated to 
presenting the main reasons why algorithms cannot 
replace human decision-makers. The second part 
discusses the reasons why such a replacement is not 
desirable. The analysis is carried out with the judge 
as the model of a decision-maker.
I. The unfeasibility of 
the replacement
11 The untenability of the replacement is mainly related 
to the role and characteristics of legal interpretation. 
Algorithms could replace human decision-makers if 
interpretation were a straightforward mechanical 
operation of textual analysis; where the meaning 
is easily found by putting together the facts and 
the norms. The said model of interpretation, which 
seems flawed, is accompanied by the conviction 
that there is a clear distinction, on the one hand, 
between interpretation and application and, on 
the other hand, between easy cases and hard cases. 
However, legal interpretation seems to have the 
opposite characteristics. Indeed, it is ubiquitous20 
and its extreme complexity relates to several 
factors,21 such as the psychological (and not merely 
cognitive) nature of the process.22 This highlights 
20 Given the features of legal interpretation in practice, the 
brocard in claris non fit interpretatio should be replaced 
by in claris fit interpretatio (cf Francesco Galgano, Tutto il 
rovescio del diritto (Giuffrè 2007) 100, who points out how the 
attempts to rule out legal interpretation by means of clear 
statutes (Carlo Ludovico Muratori) or through proposals 
to expressly prevent judges from interpreting the statutes 
(Pietro Verri) today would be laughable. cf Vittorio Villa, 
Una teoria pragmaticamente orientata dell’interpretazione 
giuridica (Giappichelli 2012).
21 For instance, due to the intrinsic vagueness of the legal 
language and because of the importance of general 
principles, one of the main tasks of judicial interpretation is 
striking a balance between conflicting interest, which shall 
be done on a case-by-case basis. However, some scholars 
believe that “balancing works with mathematical rules” 
(Pier Luigi M. Capotuorto, ‘Arithmetical Rules for the Judicial 
Balancing of Conflicts between Constitutional Principles: 
From the ‘Weight Formula’ to the Computer-Aided Judicial 
Decision’ (2007) 3(2) Rivista di Diritto, Economia e Gestione 
delle Nuove Tecnologie 171.
22 Richard A Posner, ‘The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First 
Century’ (2006) 86 B U L Rev 1049, 1060, believes that the 
psychological component is dominant when it comes to the 
sources of ideology, which plays a fundamental role in the 
decisions of all judges. Works on the prediction of judicial 
decisions usually focus on non-textual elements such as the 
nature and the gravity of the crime or the preferred policy 
position of each judge. See e.g. Benjamin E Lauderdale and 
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why it is currently impossible to develop an 
algorithm capable of interpreting the law as a human 
judge would do.23 The high degree of discretion of 
the relevant process seems to be the main reason 
for the impossibility of the replacement. Dworkin’s 
view whereby there is only one right answer to legal 
questions24 has very few defenders indeed.25 Hart26 
clearly proved his doctrine of strong discretion in 
judicial interpretation, as “a necessary byproduct 
of the inherent indeterminacy of social guidance.”27 
A factor that increases the hermeneutical discretion 
is that interpreting and applying the law requires 
value judgements and choices, which are very 
hard to formalise and compute because of their 
indeterminacy.28 One may object that AI may replace 
humans at least in the legal interpretation of easy 
cases (for instance, because there is a robust body of 
case law on the exact issue at hand). However, it has 
been shown that it is impossible to determine ex ante 
whether a case is easy or difficult: the complexity 
Tom S Clark, ‘The Supreme Court’s many median justices’ 
(2012) 106(4) American Political Science Review 847.
23 There are several studies in the field of AI & Law that develop 
models to explain the legal reasoning, but this is an ex-post 
operation, as opposed to a genuinely predictive one. See, 
for instance, Latifa Al-Abdulkarim et al., ‘A methodology for 
designing systems to reason with legal cases using Abstract 
Dialectical Frameworks’ (2016) 24(1) Artif Intell Law 1. 
24 See, for instance, Ronald Dworkin, ‘No Right Answer?’ (1978) 
53 New York University Law Review 1; Ronald Dworkin, 
Law, Morality, and Society (Peter Hacker & Joseph Raz eds, 
Clarendon Press 1977).
25 For instance, an author like Thomas B. Colby, a strong 
assertor of the rule of law, recognises that the law is often 
ambiguous or open-ended and, therefore, “there is no 
objectively correct answer that can be discerned simply by 
calling balls and strikes.” (Thomas B. Colby, ‘In Defense of 
Judicial Empathy’ (2012) 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1944, 2015) Even 
those who argue for an overcoming of the centrality of the 
Hart-Dworkin debate cannot “envision a jurisprudential 
future without Hart’s masterful work at its center” (Brian 
Leiter, ‘Beyond the Hart-Dworkin Debate: The methodology 
problem in jurisprudence’ (2003) 48 Am. J. Juris. 17, 18). For 
a recent critique to Dworkin, see Aulis Aarnio, ‘One right 
answer?’ [2011] Essays on the doctrinal study of law 165. 
As suggested by Tony Ward in his comments on a previous 
draft of this paper, one should note that, even in the event 
that Dworkin were right, it is unclear how the Hercules 
algorithm would be programmed.
26 See H. L. A Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope Bulloch & 
Joseph Raz eds, Clarendon Press 1994) 123.
27 Scott J. Shapiro, ‘The “Hart-Dworkin” debate: A short guide 
for the perplexed’ (2007) Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series No. 77, 16.
28 It has been noted that “even if computers were technically 
able to mimic legal decision making in a mechanical fashion 
they would necessarily miss the subtle institutional, value-
based, experiential, justice-oriented, and public policy 
dimensions that are the heart of lawyerly analysis” (Lisa A. 
Shay et al., ‘Do robots dream of electric law? An experiment 
in the law as algorithm’ in Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, 
and Ian Kerr (eds) Robot Law (Elgar 2016) 274, 277, citing 
Harry Surden, ‘Computable Contracts’ (2012) 46 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 629).
of the legal experience tells us that the factual 
and normative circumstances make a case easy or 
difficult. The similar suggestion to limit the use of 
algorithms to the application of the law is based, 
finally, on the wrong assumption that there is an 
interpretation-application dichotomy and that there 
is no room for interpretation when one applies the 
law. Conversely, application seems the last (and most 
important) phase of the interpretive process.29
12 Even leaving the philosophy of law aside, the actual 
development of statutory interpretation shows the 
increasing discretion of this activity. Indeed, it seems 
clear that nowadays the literal rule of interpretation 
plays a small and often rhetoric role, whereas a 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation has 
become commonplace,30 in part as a consequence 
of the EU’s influence. It has been noted that, 
whatever the philosophical view one adopts, the 
discretional power of courts is never expressed in 
a pure mechanical operation.31 A good example of 
the new face of legal interpretation is provided by 
the case of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.32 
The parliamentary debate33 clearly shows that the 
intention of the legislator was to ban the so-called 
poppers (of the class ‘alkyl nitrites’), a recreational 
drug used traditionally by men who have sex with 
men due to its effects on the relaxation of muscles 
(including the sphincter). The broad definition 
of psychoactive substance seemed to allow the 
interpretation whereby poppers were banned34 
and some law enforcement agencies applied it 
consistently.35 However, the final result is that 
29 Francesco Viola, ‘Interpretazione e indeterminatezza della 
regola giuridica’ (2002) 7-8 Diritto privato 49, 51, explains 
in this way one of the differences between Hart and Kelsen 
(the ex-ante distinction between easy and difficult cases – 
and between interpretation and application – would be 
possible adopting a Kelsenian perspective).
30 Catherine Elliott & Frances Quinn, English Legal System 
(17th ed, Pearson 2016) 61. The shift is very significant, and 
it is suggested already from the use of ‘approach’ instead 
of ‘rule’, which hints at a more flexible strategy drawing 
from several sources and taking into account many factors, 
rather the mechanical operation of subsuming a fact under 
a rule.
31 Pier Luigi M. Lucatuorto, ‘Modelli computazionali della 
discrezionalita del giudice: uno studio preliminare’ (2006) 
7(3) Ciberspazio e diritto 1, 2.
32 I am thankful to Chris Ashford for the insight provided in 
his “The UK Poppers ‘Ban’ and the Psychoactive Substances 
Act 2016: New Legal Frontiers in the Homonormative 
Imagination” (Northumbria University Gender, Sexuality 
and Law Research Seminar, Newcastle upon Tyne, 14 June 
2017).
33 The Burnham amendment and the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) one, aimed to allow poppers, were rejected.
34 Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, s 2.
35 See Steven Hopkins, ‘Crawley Police Forced To Apologise 
After Wrongly Seising Poppers After Legal High Ban Came 
Into Effect’ (Huffington Post UK, 26 May 2016) <http://www.
huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/crawley-police-forced-to-
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poppers are not banned, because the UK Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs explained that 
since poppers have a merely indirect effect on the 
nervous system, they do not technically qualify as 
psychoactive substances and, therefore, fall outside 
the scope of the Act.36 Finally, sectoral empirical 
studies37 are showing that algorithms cannot cope 
with legal interpretation in a satisfactory way. 
For instance, it has been shown38 that algorithms 
often reflect a wrong interpretation of the law 
they enforce,39 in particular with regards to the 
fair use analysis in online infringement cases.40 
These are just a couple of examples of how 
interpretation is discretionary, ubiquitous, complex, 
and unpredictable.41 Therefore, it seems that it is 
currently impossible to design an interpretive 
algorithm.
13 This study itself confirms this view, in as much as 
from an apparently simple provision, such as Article 
22 of the GDPR, stem a number of complicated 
interpretative problems for which there is no easy 
answer. The relevant difficulties will be explained 
in section 4 below. Here suffice to say that there is 
a meta-problem. Even if algorithms could perfectly 
replace human decision-makers, arguably it would 
not be fair to let them interpret a provision – Article 
22 – which has the aim of protecting citizens from 
algorithmic decisions.
14 The above considerations regard the current 
progress in algorithms-related technologies. 
apologise-after-wrongly-seising-poppers-after-legal-high-
ban-came-into-effect_uk_57472a41e4b0ebf6a3297cac> 
accessed 1 March 2018.
36 Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, ‘CMD review of 
alkyl nitrites (poppers)’ (The UK Government, 16 March 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/acmd-
review-of-alkyl-nitrites-poppers> accessed 1 March 2018.
37 Along with the studies cited in the following footnotes, see, 
for instance, Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, ‘The rise of the 
robo notice’ (2015) 58(9) Communications of the ACM 28.
38 Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, ‘Black Box Tinkering: 
Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement’ (2017) 69 
Fla. L. Rev. 181, 210.
39 Kenneth A. Bamberger, ‘Technologies of Compliance: Risk 
and Regulation in a Digital Age’ (2010) 88 Tex. L. Rev. 669, 
675-6.
40 Specifically, when the researchers tried to upload a 48 
seconds homemade video of a child dancing a protected 
song by Justin Bieber, 25% of video-sharing platforms 
removed the video, notwithstanding the fact that it clearly 
constituted a fair use.
41 Reed C. Lawlor, ‘What Computers Can Do: Analysis and 
Prediction of Judicial Decisions’ (1963) 49(4) American Bar 
Association Journal 337, conjectured that in the future 
machines would be able to predict the outcomes of judicial 
decisions. The prophecy was not fulfilled (yet), but Nikolaos 
Aletras et al., ‘Predicting judicial decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights: a Natural Language Processing 
perspective’ (2016) 2:e93 PeerJ Comput. Sci., constitute a 
progress.
However, AI’s growth is exponential, therefore the 
considerations above may prove to be wrong soon, 
especially in fields where the issues arising are 
often similar and there is a lot of precedent. Less so 
where there is no established case law, and/or the 
field is fast evolving.42 For example, predicting the 
outcome of succession cases involving only land may 
prove easier than cyber law cases with cross-border 
elements. That said, alongside the technologies, the 
scholarship is evolving. Recently, the first systematic 
study on predicting the outcome of cases tried by 
the European Court of Human Rights based solely on 
textual content was presented.43 The model is quite 
accurate, being able to predict the outcome in 79% 
of cases. However, there are some considerations 
to be made. Especially in matters as important as 
human rights, reaching a wrong decision in 21% of 
the cases would be utterly unacceptable. Secondly, 
the reasons for this margin of error should be 
better analysed; they might stem from the fact that 
interpretation is not a mere mechanical operation 
of text analysis. Thirdly, the authors themselves 
point out that the model would not be a substitute 
for the human decision-maker, because its role 
would rather be an “assisting tool”44 to identify 
cases and extract patterns. Lastly, the study did not 
predict the outcome using the documents filed by 
the applicants, but only analysing the published 
rulings. This means that a human judge had already 
selected the materials and interpreted them, which 
affects the results of the study.45 More generally, 
it still holds true that “[j]ustification, persuasion 
and discretion are the main limits of the Artificial 
Intelligence application in Law.”46
15 Second, human learning is much more complex than 
machine learning. According to the seminal Mind 
over Machine,47 the characteristics of human learning 
would explain why prophecies about real machine 
intelligence have all been proven wrong,48 and why 
42 However, as said above, it is not possible to assess ex ante 
facto whether a case is easy or hard (and even ex post facto, 
the lines are blurred and interpretation is needed for the 
hard cases as well as for the easy cases).
43 Aletras (n 41).
44 ibid 3.
45 ibid 2, assume that “the text extracted from published 
judgments of the Court bears a sufficient number of 
similarities with, and can therefore stand as a (crude) 
proxy for, applications lodged with the Court as well as 
for briefs submitted by parties in pending cases”. They 
accept, however, that “full acceptance of that reasonable 
assumption necessitates more empirical corroboration”.
46 Pier Luigi M. Lucatuorto, ‘Computer-Aided Sentencing: 
Computer Science and Legal Aspects: The Chinese Case’ 
(2006) 2(4) Rivista di Diritto, Economia e Gestione delle 
Nuove Tecnologie 388.
47 Hubert L Dreyfus and Stuart E Dreyfus, Mind over Machine: 
The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the 
Computer (Free Press 1988).
48 For instance, Herbert A Simon, The Shape of Automation for 
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small scale successful experiments conducted in 
laboratories were not as successful once extended 
to larger systems and the real world. In particular, 
machines will not be able to replace human beings 
when cognitive tasks require intuition and holistic 
thinking.49 By presenting a five-stage model of 
acquisition of expertise (novice, advanced beginner, 
competent, proficient, and expert), these authors 
show that there is more to human intelligence 
than the computer’s calculative rationality. Only 
the human brain, at least currently, is capable to 
properly learn and understand through holistic 
intuition a world that is – unlike the laboratory – 
incomplete, imprecise, and unreliable. It seems, 
indeed, unlikely that training a machine with 
millions of legal provisions and case law can lead to 
the same results to the learning of a judge, who is 
immersed in the real world and learns in ways, which 
cannot be coded.
II. Eight arguments against the 
desirability of algorithms 
replacing human decision-makers
16 Let us assume that the thesis of this paper is 
wrong. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that 
either interpretation is not ubiquitous, or it is not 
discretionary (or that algorithms can cope well with 
strongly discretionary processes). Let us posit, then, 
that algorithms can learn in the same way as the 
humans. Nonetheless, there are at least eight reasons 
why they should not replace human decision-makers. 
Two reasons refer to why one should not trust 
algorithms. Six arguments are, in turn, presented 
to show why we should trust humans.
1. The replacement is undesirable 
because there are good reasons 
not to trust the algorithms
17 Let us start with what is not to like in algorithms. One 
of the strong arguments in favour of the algorithms 
is that they are more reliable than human beings 
are. However, there is evidence that algorithms can 
Men and Management (Harper & Row1965) 38, foresaw that in 
1985 machines would have been capable of doing any work 
that a man could do. In hindsight, that prediction was not 
entirely accurate.
49 Computer “reasoning” is deemed to be ontologically 
different to human know-how: “a far superior holistic, 
intuitive way of approaching problems that cannot be 
imitated by rule-following computers” (Dreyfus (n 47) 193). 
For some recent developments in intuition modelling, see 
Ulrich Hoffrage and Julian N Marewski, ‘Unveiling the Lady 
in Black: Modeling and aiding intuition’ (2015) 4 Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 145.
make mistakes and, when they do so, the effects are 
on a larger scale than an error made by a human 
judge in a ruling.50 More importantly, algorithms are 
not more reliable than human beings, because of the 
emerging problem of algorithmic (or machine) bias.51 
The founder of the Algorithmic Justice League, for 
instance, stated that a facial recognition machine 
could not see her because she is black and, probably, 
the machine learning algorithm was trained only 
using white faces.52 Contrary to popular belief, 
algorithms do not eliminate bias, because the 
relevant models are opaque, unregulated, and 
incontestable.53 Even those who believe that AI 
should be used (in combination with law and self-
regulation) for the governance of the Internet, admit 
that the “[l]ack of transparency on how algorithms 
operate is a real issue, as well as the problem that 
artificial intelligence tends to share the biases of the 
humans it learns from.”54
18 In the context of the UK inquiry on algorithms in 
decision-making,55 six reasons why algorithmic 
systems can produce biased outcomes have been 
presented.56 First, design choices make the decision-
making process or the factors it considers too 
opaque; these choices may also limit the control of 
the designer.57 Second, the output of the system may 
50 One need only think of the wrong calculations that 
affected 20.000 divorced couples due to a software glitch 
(see, e.g. Will Grice, ‘Divorce error on form caused by UK 
Government software glitch could affect 20,000 people’ (The 
Independent, 18 December 2015) <http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ministry-of-justice-software-
glitch-could-see-thousands-revisiting-painful-divorce-
settlements-a6777851.html> accessed 1 March 2018.
51 Cf. Megan Garcia, ‘Racist in the Machine: The Disturbing 
Implications of Algorithmic Bias’ (2016) 33(4) World Policy 
Journal 111, and, more generally, Kroll (n 13) 633.
52 <http://www.ajlunited.org/> accessed 1 March 2018. These 
kind of problems had already been evidenced by Brandan 
F. Klare et al., ‘Face Recognition Performance: Role of 
Demographic Information’ (2012) 7(6) IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security 1789.
53 This is one of main ideas of O’Neil (n 19).
54 Andrés Guadamuz, ‘Whatever happened to our dream of an 
empowering Internet (and how to get it back)’ (TechnoLlama, 
5 June 2017), <http://www.technollama.co.uk/whatever-
happened-to-our-dream-of-an-empowering-internet-
and-how-to-get-it-back> accessed 1 March 2018. On the 
phenomenon of machine bias (or algorithmic bias) see 
below.
55 <https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/
committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-technology-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry9/> 
accessed 1 March 2018. 
56 Science and Technology Committee, ‘Written evidence 
submitted by Dr Alison Powell (ALG0067)’ (UK Parliament, 
2017) <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-
technology-committee/algorithms-in-decisionmaking/
written/69121.html> accessed 1 March 2018.
57 Alan Dix, ‘Human issues in the use of pattern recognition 
techniques’, in R Beale and J Finlay (eds), Neural Networks 
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be affected by the biases in data collection.58 Third, 
unlike human beings, algorithms cannot balance 
biases in interpretation of data by a conscious 
attention to the redress of the bias.59 Fourth, there 
are biases in the ways that learning algorithms are 
tuned based on the testing users’ behaviour.60 Fifth, 
algorithms may be designed for a purpose, but then 
inserted into systems designed for other purposes.61 
Lastly, as already said with regard to the Algorithmic 
Justice League, another factor is the biases in the 
data used to train the decision-making systems.62
19 Algorithmic bias is the main problem regarding 
automated decision-making with legal effects.63 It 
has been submitted that “while persistent inequities 
stem from a complex set of factors, digitally 
automated systems may be adding to these problems 
in new ways.”64 It is arguable that even if the 
automated decision (e.g. a ruling) is biased, the move 
to algorithms “may at least have the salutary effect 
of making bias more evident.”65 Algorithmic bias is 
dealt with in a recital of the GDPR,66 in a way which 
is not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, the GDPR calls on 
the data controller to “use appropriate mathematical 
or statistical procedures for the profiling, implement 
technical and organisational measures appropriate 
to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in 
inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the 
risk of errors is minimised, secure personal data in 
a manner that takes account of the potential risks 
involved for the interests and rights of the data 
subject and that prevents, inter alia, discriminatory 
effects”67 on the basis of sensitive data. Now, it would 
seem that the GDPR’s focus is misplaced. The point 
with discrimination is not only that the data are 
inaccurate or that they are not secure. The main 
problem is that these data should never be used 
and Pattern Recognition in Human Computer Interaction (Ellis 
Horwood 1992) 429.
58 Stella Lowry & Gordon Macpherson, ‘A blot on the 
profession’ (1988) 296 British Medical Journal 657.
59 Aylin Caliskan et al., ‘Semantics derived automatically 
from language corpora contain human-like biases’ (2017) 
356(6334) Science 183.
60 Dix (n 57) 57.
61 Louise Amoore, The politics of possibility: risk and security 
beyond probability (Duke University Press 2013). 
62 Klare (n 52).
63 Algorithmic bias has many potential consequences. For 
instance, in the context of social media, it may lead to 
the so-called filter bubble. See, e.g., William H. Dutton et 
al., ‘Search and Politics: The Uses and Impacts of Search 
in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the 
United States’ (Quello Center Working Paper No. 5-1-17, 2017).
64 Seeta Peña Gangadharan et al., Data and Discrimination: 
Collected Essays (Open Technology Institute 2014).
65 Barocas (n 12) 9.
66 GDPR, recital 71.
67 ibid
to discriminate in the first place,68 regardless of 
their being accurate or not, or that independency 
constraints should be put in place.69
20 The second argument revolves around transparency. 
Indeed, making bias evident would mean ensuring 
transparency, which seems a chimera for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that the more accurate 
an algorithm is, the less transparent.70 The trade-
off accuracy vs. transparency is easily explained. 
On the one hand, modelers tend to develop more 
accurate models “with increasingly complex, data-
mining-based black-box models.”71 On the other 
hand, model users tend to favour “transparent, 
interpretable models not only for predictive 
decision-making but also for after-the-fact auditing 
and forensic purposes.”72 Against the dominant idea 
that transparency will solve all the problems, some 
scholars point out that “[d]isclosure of source code 
is often neither necessary (because of alternative 
techniques from computer science) nor sufficient 
(because of the issues analysing code) to demonstrate 
the fairness of a process.”73 Arguably, however, such 
disclosure would be necessary to comply with the 
right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial under 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
21 The lack of transparency is related to the so-called 
black box (better said, black boxes). Arguably, three 
different black boxes may be distinguished: the 
organisational; the technical; and the legal one. 
The organisational black box will not be the subject 
of specific analysis. Suffice to say that algorithms 
are mostly implemented by “private, profit-
maximising entities, operating under minimal 
68 Rakesh Agrawal and Ramakrishnan Srikant, ‘Privacy-
Preserving Data Mining’ (2000) 29(2) ACM SIGMOD Record 
439 (2000).
69 Toon Calders et al., ‘Building Classifiers with Independency 
Constraints’ (2009) IEEE ICDM Workshop on Domain Driven 
Data Mining 13. Therefore, for instance, sensitive attributes 
such as sex shall be included, but the program would be 
instructed to make predictions independently of the said 
attributes. This second approach seems preferable for 
accountability reasons.
70 Barocas (n 12) 9 accept that “algorithms may involve rules 
of such complexity that they defy attempts to trace their 
reasoning”.
71 Innocent Kamwa et al., ‘On the accuracy versus transparency 
trade-off of data-mining models for fast-response PMU-
based catastrophe predictors’ (2012) 3(1) IEEE Transactions 
on smart grid 152.
72 ibid 152. They conclude that “for catastrophe anticipation 
purposes, we would favor fuzzy logic-based transparent 
solutions over black box solutions for implementation ease 
and robustness, as well as for their suitability in the auditing 
process, even while sacrificing some predictive accuracy” 
(ibid 160).
73 Kroll (n 13) 633.
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transparency obligations.”74 As to the technical 
black box, artificial intelligence makes the rationale 
of decisions intrinsically difficult to access. This 
is particularly evident with the so-called neural 
networks that, being modelled on the brain, are 
at least as opaque. One need only imagine a deep-
learning neural network which is trained using old 
mammograms that have been labelled according to 
which women went on to develop breast cancer.75 It 
could help us to make predictions on which breasts 
are likely to develop cancer, but without knowing 
the risk factors (the rationale), it is unlikely that 
the patient would undergo therapy and, more 
generally, the development of cancer research would 
not be substantive. The legal black box relates to 
intellectual property and will be presented in the 
following section.
22 The lack of transparency has obvious repercussions 
on the accountability issue. For instance, ensuring 
fair, lawful, and transparent processing may 
be difficult “due to the way in which machine 
learning works and / or the way machine learning 
is integrated into a broader workflow that might 
involve the use of data of different origins and 
reliability, specific interventions by human 
operators, and the deployment of machine learning 
products and services.”76 Some technical tools to 
ensure accountability in algorithmic scenarios have 
been presented,77 but they do not seem sufficient 
to offset the inherent problems in algorithmic 
decision-making.
2. The replacement is undesirable 
because there are good reasons 
to trust the human beings
23 This subsection is dedicated to the reasons why one 
74 Perel & Elkin-Koren (n 38) 181.
75 The scenario, imagined by Andrea Vedaldi (University of 
Oxford) is referred to by Davide Castelvecchi, ‘Can we open 
the black box of AI?’ (Nature, 15 October 2016) <http://
www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-of-
ai-1.20731> accessed 1 March 2018. cf Krzysztof J Geras, 
Stacey Wolfson, Yiqiu Shen, S. Gene Kim, Linda Moy, and 
Kyunghyun Cho, ‘High-Resolution Breast Cancer Screening 
with Multi-View Deep Convolutional Neural Networks’ 
(2017) arXiv:1703.07047 [cs.CV].
76 Dimitra Kamarinou et al., ‘Machine Learning with Personal 
Data’ (Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 247, 2016) 22. Christopher Kuner et al., ‘Machine learning 
with personal data: is data protection law smart enough to 
meet the challenge?’ (2017) 7(1) International Data Privacy 
Law 1, observe that “[m]achine learning is data driven, 
typically involving both existing data sets and live data 
streams in complex training and deployment workflow 
[therefore it] may be difficult to reconcile such dynamic 
processes with purposes that are specified narrowly in 
advance.”
77 Kroll (n 13) 633.
should trust humans over algorithms and, more 
generally, over non-human agents.
24 First, human beings tend to emulate the behaviour 
of the majority of fellow human beings. This should 
ensure consistency and predictability in societal 
behaviours. This phenomenon was observed with 
particular clarity by Solomon Asch, who developed 
the so-called psychology of conformity.78 Needless 
to say that non-human agents do not have a 
consciousness79 and, therefore, psychology does 
not apply to them. One could object, however, that 
conforming to the majority does not equal pursuing 
the common good, because it could lead to the 
oppression of the minorities. However, humans have 
some built-in safeguards.
25 The argument can be put forward that, despite the 
different characteristics of human beings, humans 
tend to act consistently towards the common good. 
This may be explained with the power of sanctions.80 
Human beings comply with the law not for a natural 
disposition, but because they do not wish to be 
sanctioned. However, it is hardly arguable that 
non-human agents share this fear. Indeed, neither 
can they be imprisoned (criminal sanctions), nor do 
they own assets that can be used to execute civil and 
administrative sanctions.
26 The third argument refers, like the previous one, 
to the effects of group pressure, but in a different 
setting. It can be summed up by saying that 
hypocrisy has a civilising force.81 Indeed, with 
regards to the relationship between deliberation 
and publicity, it has been observed that “the effect 
of an audience is to replace the language of interest 
by the language of reason and to replace impartial 
motives by passionate ones.”82 These considerations, 
rooted in human psychology, do not apply to non-
human agents. Therefore, hypocrisy cannot civilise 
algorithmic decision-makers. 
27 Let us say that it is possible for an algorithm to learn 
and decide like a human judge. At this point, one 
78 See Solomon E Asch, ‘Effects of group pressure upon the 
modification and distortion of judgment’, in H Guetzkow 
(ed), Groups, leadership and men (Carnegie Press 1951) 222.
79 However, there is a significant debate about artificial 
consciousness, whose functions have been described as 
including awareness of self, will, instinct, and emotion 
(Igor Aleksander, ‘Machine consciousness’ (2008) 3(2) 
Scholarpedia 4162). It seems that the prevalent position in 
the literature is against the existence of a proper artificial 
consciousness.
80 cf Antonio Pagliaro, ‘Sanzione. Sanzione penale’ [1992] 28 
Enciclopedia giuridica 3; David R Carp, ‘The Judicial and 
Judicious Use of Shame Penalties’ (1998) 44(2) Crime & 
Delinquency 277.
81 Jon Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press 1998).
82 ibid 111.
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may argue, it would be sufficient to find the best 
judge in the world and create a large number of non-
human clones that will gradually replace all human 
judges. However, this scenario raises some issues. 
Pluralism seems to be the main one.83 Indeed, if 
pluralism is rooted in the respect for the minorities 
and in the belief that a multiplicity of viewpoints 
enriches the understanding of the world, then 
erasing this by cloning the perfect judge would at 
least be problematic. Even before that, how does one 
find the perfect judge to clone? What does it mean to 
be the best judge? Is it possible to entirely eliminate 
human bias?84 
28 A fifth reason why this paper takes a humanist 
stance is empathy, which is the “cognitive ability 
to understand a situation from the perspective of 
other people, combined with the emotional capacity 
to comprehend and feel those people’s emotions in 
that situation.”85 This could come as a surprise, since 
usually empathy is seen as a bias86 and, therefore, 
as an argument in favour of non-human agents. 
Conversely, empathy is “a requirement of judicial 
neutrality.”87 It has been shown that arguments 
in favour of judicial empathy are rooted, perhaps 
unexpectedly, in “a firm commitment to the rule 
of law and a deep-seated appreciation of—rather 
than rejection of— legal doctrine.”88 A recent study 
shed light on the shortcomings of the anti-empathic 
consensus; indeed, it descends of XIX century 
formalism, but it has “drifted from its source such 
that it would almost certainly be condemned by the 
very formalist scholars from whom it is descended.”89 
Not only is empathy not a defect in human decision-
making, it serves a positive function. This is 
required by the paramount function of concepts 
such as reasonableness and balancing tests.90 More 
generally, it can be argued that empathy is the way 
justice (as opposed to law) enters the decision. When 
83 When asked about this argument during the conferences 
cited in the acknowledgments, the audience also mentioned 
other negative repercussions. The most relevant one seems 
to be the lack of legal innovation deriving from a single 
approach to decision-making.
84 As to the last question, it is submitted that if one eliminates 
ideologies in the attempt of eliminating bias, the output 
would be a useless algorithm, incapable of deciding. Indeed, 
ideologies guide human judges in deciding, for instance, 
whether intellectual property rights should prevail over 
access to knowledge, whether the reasons of privacy should 
take precedence over those of free speech, etc.
85 Colby (n 25) 1945.
86  See, e.g., Adam N Glynn and Maya Sen, ‘Identifying Judicial 
Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for 
Women’s Issues?’ (2015) 59(1) American Journal of Political 
Science 37.
87 Colby (n 25) 2015.
88 ibid 1946.
89 Brenner Fissel, ‘Modern critiques of judicial empathy: A 
revised intellectual history’ (2016) Mich. St. L. Rev 817.
90 Colby (n 25) 1946.
Cicero wrote “summum ius summa iniuria”91 he meant 
that the mechanical application of the law leads to 
unjust results. Empathy tempers legalistic excesses 
and algorithms are not capable of it.
29 Lastly, one needs to choose between democracy and 
technocracy. In a democratic context, laws are the 
product of a debate between politicians. This debate 
is public, and the politicians are democratically 
elected and accountable both politically and legally. 
Human judges are either democratically elected 
or receive specific legal training. Conversely, 
algorithmic law (as in Lessig’s “code is law”92) is 
more problematic. Indeed, “software development, 
even open source, is opaque, and concentrated in a 
small programming community, many of whom are 
employed by few oligopolistic corporations directly 
accountable to no external party.”93 Algorithms 
could be suitable to apply algorithmic laws, but given 
the said characteristics, it is hoped that their role 
and scope remains limited.
30 For the reasons above, the replacement of 
algorithms to human beings seems both unfeasible 
and undesirable.
C. Intellectual property rights: more 
a problem, than a solution
31 Even though there are good reasons to believe that 
algorithms cannot and should not replace human 
decision-makers, it is becoming obvious that the 
replacement is already taking place, regardless of 
the relevant pitfalls. Therefore, a lawyer should be 
able to provide a sufficiently clear answer to a client 
subject to an algorithmic decision.
32 There are at least three routes that can be taken, 
should the relevant requirements be met. In this 
section, the focus will be on intellectual property 
and the relevant exceptions that may enable access 
to a computer program implementing an algorithm, 
or the relevant invention, notwithstanding its 
proprietary nature. The features of the analysed 
exceptions made scholars talk of “the advent of a 
more active approach to copyright exceptions,”94 
which creates quasi-rights, “legal hybrids between 
exceptions and rights.”95 This must be taken into 
account when interpreting the relevant provisions 
91 Cicero, De officiis, I, 10, 33.
92 Lawrence Lessig, Code (v.2.0, Basic Books 2006).
93 Kieron O’Hara, ‘Smart contracts – Dumb idea’ (2017) The 
Digital Citizen 2, 5.
94 Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou, ‘The lawful user and a balancing 
of interests in European copyright law’ (2010) 41 IIC 819, 
826.
95 ibid 826.
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and striking a balance with the restricted acts. 
Equally, defences to patent infringement will be 
dealt with, although there is not enough evidence 
to claim their nature as quasi-rights.
33 A major issue is understanding the rationale of 
algorithmic decisions. This is made difficult by the so-
called black boxes. The organisational black box and 
the technical one have been presented above. The 
legal black box remains to be analysed. This depends 
primarily on the (ab)use of intellectual property 
rights (trade secrets, database rights, etc.) and the 
kindred rights that companies are collecting on the 
users’ data, that do not fit easily in the traditional 
intellectual property categories and are leading to 
the datafication of the digital economy. Along the 
same lines, it has been noted that “data, originating 
from users, from devices, sent through the 4G and 
5G networks to the client servers and the Cloud are 
heavily boxed in by intellectual property rights.”96 
34 Even though there are many open-source machine 
learning frameworks (e.g. Apache Singa, Shogun, 
and TensorFlow), most AI algorithms are proprietary 
(Google search and Facebook news feed are the 
classical examples) i.e. covered primarily by trade 
secrets,97 which is the “most common form of 
protection used by business.”98 Under the new Trade 
Secrets Directive,99 algorithms can be covered by 
trade secrets because they are not generally known 
or easily accessible and they have commercial 
value.100 This is true as long as the person who 
has control of the algorithm takes steps to keep it 
secret.101 The general rule is that the unauthorised 
acquisition, use, or disclosure of algorithms covered 
by trade secrets is unlawful.102 However, the 
acquisition shall be lawful in a limited number of 
96 Bjorn Lundqvist, ‘Big Data, Open Data, Privacy Regulations, 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law in an Internet 
of Things World’ (Faculty of Law, University of Stockholm 
Research Paper No. 1/2016) 10.
97 This has the potential to impact many fundamental rights, 
such as the one of access to public information. For instance, 
crashes such as the one that, on 6 May 2010, caused the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average to drop by 9% thus burning 
millions of dollars, cannot be explained “not least because 
many of the algorithms involved are proprietary” (Scholz (n 
3) 103).
98 James Pooley, ‘Trade secrets: The other IP right’ (2013) 3 
WIPO Magazine.
99 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed 
know-how and business information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (Trade Secrets 
Directive). Member States shall transpose it by 9 June 2018. 
By that date, the UK will still be part of the EU, but prima 
facie there are not significant differences between the rules 
on the breach of confidentiality and the new EU regime.
100 Trade Secrets Directive, art 2(1)(a)-(b).
101 Trade Secrets Directive, art 2(1)(c).
102 Trade Secrets Directive, art 4.
circumstances, the most relevant of which seems to 
be the “observation, study, disassembly or testing 
of a product or object that has been made available 
to the public or that is lawfully in the possession 
of the acquirer of the information who is free from 
any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the 
trade secret.”103 This appears to be a reference to 
one of the permitted uses of computer programs 
under the Software Directive.104 There is a potential 
contrast between the two regimes. To say that the 
acquisition is legal only if “free from any legally valid 
duty to limit [it],”105 may be construed as meaning 
that if the owner of the algorithm contractually 
restricts the said exception, then no observation, 
study, disassembling, or testing of the algorithm 
would be allowed. However, under the Software 
Directive, there is a right to “observe, study or test 
the functioning of the program in order to determine 
the ideas and principles which underlie any element 
of the program.”106 This Directive goes on pointing 
out that any contractual provisions contrary to said 
exception “shall be null and void.”107 In the UK, the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is clear 
where it provides that “it is irrelevant whether or not 
there exists any term or condition in an agreement 
which purports to prohibit or restrict the act (such 
terms being […] void).”108 The leading case on the 
matter is SAS Institute v World Programming, where it 
was found that copyright owners cannot restrict the 
purposes for which the analysed permitted acts are 
carried out. Additionally, even though only lawful 
users can avail themselves of the defence, these are 
not limited to those who click through the licence.109
103 Trade Secrets Directive, art 3(1)(b).
104 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs (Software Directive).
105 Trade Secrets Directive, art 3(1)(b).
106 Software Directive, art 5(3).
107 Software Directive, art 8(2). See also recital 16.
108 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 50BA and 
296A. The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 
1992, SI 1992/3233 inserted s 50B in the Copyrights, 
Designs and Patents Act 1998, allowing lawful users of 
computer programs to decompile programs to achieve 
interoperability. In turn, the Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations 2003 introduced s 50BA, regarding the 
exception on observing, studying and testing computer 
programs.
109 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd III [2013] EWHC 69 
(Ch), [60]-[61]. In that case, employees who did not click 
through the licence had observed and studied the computer 
programme without infringing copyright because the 
colleague who acquired the programme was operating on 
behalf of the employer, which was a legal person. It was 
deemed immaterial that the licence openly restricted the 
use to the person who clicked through the licence. At a 
closer look, the distinction between licensed employee and 
unlicensed ones. Indeed, art 9(1) of the Software Directive 
renders null and void any contractual restrictions to the 
exceptions and “this includes a contractual restriction on 
the employees by whom a legal person in the position of 
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35 Moreover, the Trade Secrets Directive itself 
recognises the legality of the acquisition, use or 
disclosure of trade secrets for purposes of freedom 
of expression and information.110 Arguably, there is 
not an actual conflict here. As an example, let us 
imagine one buys an Amazon Echo. Under one of 
the several contracts that one has to accept, one 
agrees that “all Confidential Information will remain 
[Amazon’s] exclusive property”111 and one may not 
“reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble”112 the 
Alexa113 Service or the Alexa Materials.114 Under 
the Trade Secrets Directive this section would be 
enforceable; however, since the Software Directive, 
being a lex specialis, will prevail the section would 
be unenforceable.115 Indeed, the conflict is merely 
ostensible. 
36 In the event that trade secrets were deemed to 
prevail over the exceptions provided by the Software 
Directive, it may be worth it to take account of the 
relevant defences. The most relevant and flexible 
defence seems the public interest one. It has been 
stated that “the right of confidentiality, whether or 
not founded in contract, is not absolute. That right 
must give way where it is in the public interest that 
WPL can exercise the right under Article 5(3)” (ibid [61]). 
The decision was upheld in appeal, although for different 
reasons (SAS Institute v Worlds Programming Ltd IV [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1482 [61], [109] per Tomlinson LJ).
110 Trade Secrets Directive, art 5(a). However, this defence risks 
weaknesses because the courts may be tempted to interpret 
it narrowly given that the underlying debate was about the 
protection of whistle-blowers and journalists, as one can 
also infer from the express reference to the freedom and 
pluralism of media.
111 Alexa Voice Service Agreement (last updated 30 January 
2017), s 8. The Agreement was updated on 15 February 
2018 in order to add Amazon Seller Services Pvt Ltd as 
the Amazon Party to the Agreement for developers who 
reside in India. Since the update is minor, this paper keeps 
referring to the previous version.
112 Alexa Voice Service Agreement, s 9.
113 Amazon’s AI virtual assistant.
114 These include “images, audio, logos, specifications, code, 
documents, data, software, software development kits, 
libraries, application programming interfaces, applications, 
services and other information, technology, and related 
materials” (Alexa Voice Service Agreement, s 2).
115 In SAS Institute Inc v Worlds Programming Ltd I (WPL) [2010] 
EWHC 1829 (Ch), a similar program had been developed 
studying the competitor’s one in breach of the license 
terms, because the purpose of the permitted act was not 
learning to use the SAS system (the sole purpose allowed 
by the license). After the reference to the Court of Justice 
and SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd II [2012] ECR, 
the national court stated that if an act (e.g. studying) is 
permitted by the license, the purpose thereof is immaterial, 
and the exception operates (SAS Institute III (n 109); SAS 
Institute IV (n 109) [101]. On the EU case, see Guido Noto 
La Diega, ‘Le idee e il muro del suono: I programmi per 
elaboratore nella più recente giurisprudenza europea’ 
(2013) 2 Europa e diritto private 543.
the confidential information shall be made public.”116 
It is noteworthy that the disclosure may be seen as in 
the public interest if there has been non-compliance 
with a legal obligation.117 One may argue that the 
circumvention of the Software Directive consisting 
in secreting an algorithm in an absolute way falls 
within this scenario. However, the defendant in the 
relevant infringement proceedings would need to 
prove that the disclosure be in the public interest 
and not merely interesting to the public, which 
may be difficult.118 Unfortunately, the Trade Secrets 
Directive does not leave much room for the public 
interest or other defences. However, it recognises 
that the Directive shall not affect “the application 
of [EU] or national rules requiring trade secret 
holders to disclose, for reasons of public interest, 
information, including trade secrets, to the public 
or to administrative or judicial authorities for the 
performance of the duties of those authorities.”119 The 
European provision regarding the exceptions does 
not introduce a stand-alone public interest defence. 
Indeed, a defence is available if the acquisition, 
use, or disclosure was “for revealing misconduct, 
wrongdoing or illegal activity, provided that the 
respondent acted for the purpose of protecting the 
general public interest”.120 Unlike the EU, in the UK 
the public interest is a defence in its own right.121 
Since the transposition deadline is in June 2018, 
one needs to wait and see how this provision will 
be interpreted.122 
37 Additionally, one should remember that copyright 
protection covers both source code and object 
code123 of the computer program implementing the 
algorithm. However, it leaves out some aspects, such 
as functionalities, data file formats, programming 
language, and graphic user interface. They are treated 
as “ideas” and therefore not copyrightable due to 
the idea-expression dichotomy.124 The dichotomy is 
116 Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EMLR 31, [23].
117 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 
(4th ed, OUP 2014) 1181.
118 Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526, 537.
119 Trade Secrets Directive, art 1(2)(b).
120 Trade Secrets Directive, art 5(b).
121 Initial Services v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396.
122 The only Member State that transposed the Trade Secrets 
Directive is Croatia, with Zakon o zaštiti neobjavljenih 
informacija s tržišnom vrijednosti (‘Law on the Protection of 
Unpublished Information with Market Value’) of 30 March 
2018. Regrettably, not only the Croatian statute does not 
introduce a stand-alone public interest defence: it introduces 
an exception which is narrower than the Directive, being 
seemingly reduced to a defence for journalists (see art 8(1) 
and its reference to reporting, media, and pluralism).
123 Agreement on the trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights (TRIPs), art 10(1).
124 In the field of computer programs, on the idea whereby 
copyright covers the expression of the ideas and not the 
ideas in themselves, see SAS Institute II (n 117); Navitaire Inc 
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also one of the alleged reasons of the patentability 
of computer-implemented inventions. It has been 
noted, indeed, “copyright is not a sufficient form of 
protection where it is the idea behind the program 
which is its commercially valuable element.”125 
Computer-related inventions are growing 
significantly also in connection to the Internet of 
Things,126 despite the fact that the relevant patents 
can stifle innovation.127 In the US,128 in September 
2017, there were 481,608 patent specifications 
referring to algorithms.129 More than 67% of the 
algorithm-related patents (325,805) were issued over 
the last ten years with a growing trend reflecting the 
general increase in patents as shown by Table 1 and 
Graph 1.130 Nearly 13% of all patents granted over the 
last 12 months concern algorithms (ten years ago 
only 9% of patents were algorithm-related).
38 Table 1. Software and algorithm patent trends in 
the US (2007-2017).
Period All patents 
granted
Software 
patents
Algorithm 
patents
2016-2017* 346,543 115,896 44,110
2015-2016 333,767 108,305 42,481
2014-2015 329,722 104,212 41,125
2013-2014 327,729 103,918 42,215
2012-2013 288,989 84,891 35,427
2011-2012 268,157 74,689 32,070
v EasyJet Airline Co Ltd (III) [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch). On the 
graphic user interface (GUI), see Bezpečnostní softwarová 
asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] 
ECR I-13971.
125 Daniel J.M. Attridge, ‘Challenging claims! 
Patenting computer programs in Europe and the USA’ 
(2001) 1 Intellectual Property Quarterly 22.
126 Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Software patents and the Internet of 
Things in Europe, the United States, and India’ (2017) 39(3) 
European Intellectual Property Review 173.
127 As shown by Daehwan Koo, ‘Patent and copyright 
protection of computer programs’ (2002) Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 172, 173, “[p]atent and copyright do 
not provide optimum protection for software innovations, 
because they are based on exclusive property rights which 
impede follow-on small-scale innovations such as software 
innovations”.
128 The search engine of the European Patent Office does not 
allow to retrieve data of a similar granularity.
129 These data and the following data, including those used in 
Table 1, were retrieved (and partly calculated) using the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent Full-Text 
and Image Database, accessed on 9 September 2017. The 
method is the same used by Allen Clark Zoracki, ‘When 
Is an Algorithm Invented: The Need for a New Paradigm 
for Evaluating an Algorithm for Intellectual Property 
Protection’ (2005) 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 579, 585, with 
regards to the patents granted between 1994 and 2003.
130 The faster growth of software patents may be related also to 
the fact that algorithms can be perceived as mere abstract 
ideas non-eligible for patent protection. Therefore, some 
applicants may purposely shy away from using the word 
‘algorithm’ in the specifications.
2010-2011 244,338 63,638 27,377
2009-2010 229,694 56,367 24,920
2008-2009 190,285 42,947 19,426
2007-2008 185,340 38,225 17,871
* The period analysed is from 9 September 2016 to 9 September 2017. The same applies 
to the following rows.
39 In theory, in the countries that signed the European 
Patent Convention (and in the others which adopted 
a hybrid system,131 such as India), computer 
programs are not patentable “as such”.132 Features 
of the computer program,133 as well as the presence 
of a device defined in the claim134 may lend technical 
character. Moreover, a computer program by itself 
can be patented if it brings about a further technical 
effect going beyond the normal physical interactions 
between the said program and the computer.135 
In the UK, after Symbian v Comptroller-General of 
Patents,136 the focus is not on the question whether 
the contribution falls within the excluded subject 
matter,137 but on whether the invention makes a 
technical contribution to the known art, even if the 
computer program does not bring any novel effect 
outside of a computer.138
131 There are mainly three systems for the protection of 
computer programs. First, one may refer to the double 
binary of copyright and patent protection, as exemplified by 
the US approach. Second, there is the hybrid system where 
alongside copyright, there is a rule excluding computer 
programs from patentability, but only if claimed ‘as such.’ 
This is the system that one finds in Europe. Finally, there 
is single binary (only copyright) protection. This system is 
the least common, see the Philippines, which are moving 
towards the hybrid system. There is a convergence between 
the double binary and the hybrid systems, with a trend 
towards a de facto generalised double binary.
132 European Patent Convention, art 52(2).
133 T 1173/97 (Computer program product) of 1 July 1998.
134 T 0424/03 (Clipboard formats I/MICROSOFT) of 23 February 
2006; T 0258/03 (Auction method/HITACHI) of 21 April 
2004.
135 G 3/08 (Referral by the President of the EPO in relation 
to a point of law … of 16 October 2009; T 1173/97 
(Computerprogrammprodukt) of 1 July 1998.
136 [2008] EWCA Civ 1066, [16] [49] [51 [59].
137 This was the law under Aerotel v Telco Holdings [2007] 1 All ER 
225, [40].
138 Shopalotto.com Ltd, Re patent application GB 0017772.5: PATC 
7 November 2005 [2005] EWHC 2416 (Pat), found that in 
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40 Even though some courts or examiners may consider 
algorithms as computer programs, they should 
probably be more precisely seen as mathematical 
methods. The European Patent Office’s Board of 
Appeals stated that algorithms are mathematical 
methods, as such deemed to be non-inventions; 
therefore, a technical character of the algorithm 
can be recognised only if it serves a technical 
purpose.139 The fact that a computer-implemented 
invention includes an algorithm can make the 
latter patentable. Indeed, it has been recognised 
that mathematical algorithms may contribute to 
the technical character of an invention, inasmuch 
as they serve a technical purpose.140 For example, 
text classification does not qualify as technical 
purpose.141 A technical effect may arise either from 
the provision of data about a technical process, or 
from the provision of data that is applied directly in 
a technical process.142 However, the inclusion of an 
algorithm in a patent application for a computer-
implemented invention does not, in itself, ensure 
patentability. Indeed, not all efficiency aspects of 
an algorithm are by definition without relevance 
for the question of whether the algorithm provides 
a technical contribution. However, such technical 
considerations must go beyond merely finding a 
computer algorithm to carry out some procedure.143 
In the US, legal scholars144 have focused on how to 
evidence an improvement in algorithmic technique. 
It has been suggested to run the algorithm on test 
problems with known solutions and compare the 
results with those of algorithms in the prior art, with 
particular regards to speed, performance, memory 
usage, and ease of implementation.145
41 Unlike copyright, most uses of a computer-
implemented invention are prohibited if not 
a claim for a lottery game played on the internet, the 
technical effect did not go beyond the mere loading of a 
program into a computer.
139 T 1784/06 (Classification method/COMPTEL) of 21 
September 2012. In the UK, in Gale’s Application [1991] RPC 
305, it was held that an algorithm used to calculate square 
roots could not be patented because it lacked any technical 
character.
140 Ibid. 3.1.1. See also T 2249/13 (Mobile device/TRADE 
CAPTURE) of 17 October 2014.
141 T 1358/09 (Classification/BDGB ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE) of 
21 November 2014; T 1316/09 of 18 December 2012.
142 T 1670/07 (Shopping with mobile device/NOKIA) of 11 July 
2013.
143 T 1358/09 (n 142); see G 3/08 (n 136). HTC Europe Co Ltd v 
Apple Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 451, provides a good guidance 
to understand if computer programs and algorithms are 
patentable because the invention produces a technical 
effect that goes beyond the excluded subject matter.
144 Zoracki (n 129) 579.
145 ibid 605.
authorised and maybe that is why scholars tend 
to overlook patent exceptions.146 However, in 
proceedings for infringement, defendants may avail 
themselves of the private non-commercial use147 and 
experimental use148 defences. One can qualify for the 
first immunity even when the resulting information 
has a commercial benefit, or the subjective intention 
was not commercial.149 This is particularly interesting 
because in the UK there is no private copy exception 
to copyright.150 As to the second defence, activities to 
discover something unknown, to test a hypothesis or 
to assess whether an invention works are considered 
as experiments and non-infringing.151 However, 
this defence may be of limited use in the context of 
accessing algorithms, because it cannot be invoked 
to show that a product works in the way claimed 
by the maker.152 Yet, arguably, when accessing 
the algorithm, the affected individual would have 
an interest to show that the algorithm-related 
invention does not work in the way claimed by the 
maker. Thus, this defence could be usefully invoked 
when an algorithm-related invention is used to take 
decisions whose rationale one wants to contest.
42 Intellectual property seems to create more problems 
than solutions to the issue at hand. The route above 
is weak for at least four reasons. First, the overlap 
between, if not abuse of, intellectual property 
rights153 create a legal black box which is very 
difficult to open. Second, the application of the study 
and observation exception presupposes the lawful 
use of a copy of the software,154 which is rarely the 
case in the event of algorithmic decisions. Third, 
even though the analysed copyright exceptions have 
been qualified as quasi-rights, there is no precedent 
146 See David Gilat, Experimental use and patents (Wiley 1995); Alan 
J Devlin, ‘Restricting experimental use’ (2009) 32(2) Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 599; Jessica C Lai, ‘A right to 
adequate remuneration for the experimental use exception 
in patent law: collectively managing our way through 
the thickets and stacks in research?’ (2016) 1 Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 63.
147 Patents Act 1977, s 60(5)(a).
148 Patents Act 1977, s 60(5)(b).
149 SKF Laboratories Ltd v Evans Medical Ltd [1989] FSR 513.
150 See Guido Noto La Diega, ‘In Light of the Ends. Copyright 
Hysteresis and Private Copy Exception after the British 
Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) 
and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills Case’, in Studi giuridici europei 2014 (C Franchini ed, 
Giappichelli 2016) 39.
151 Monsanto Co. v Stauffer Chemicals Co. and another [1985] RPC 
515 (CA); Micro-Chemicals et al. v Smith Kline and French Inter-
American Corporation (1971) 25 DLR 78, 89.
152 Monsanto (n 152) 542; Auchinloss v Agricultural and Veterinary 
Supplies Ltd [1999] RPC 397, 405.
153 cf, more generally, Neil Wilkof and Shamnad Basheer (eds) 
Overlapping Intellectual Property Rights (OUP 2012).
154 Only the ‘person having a right to use a copy of a computer 
program’ can avail themselves of the exception (Software 
Directive, art 5(3).
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interpreting said exceptions to open the algorithmic 
black box. Lastly, it requires considerable skills to 
open an algorithm by observing and studying the 
software that implements it. In most cases, there 
would be the need to ask an expert third party to 
carry out such activities on behalf of the lawful user 
of the software. However, applying SAS Institute,155 it 
is unclear whether said third parties would qualify 
as lawful users. In the negative, this exception would 
be of little use in the majority of cases.
43 To add to the complexity, intellectual property will 
always be balanced with competing interests, such 
as data protection. As correctly pointed out, for 
instance, “trade secrecy (…) may make it difficult 
for data controllers to comply with their obligation 
of transparent processing.”156 Let us have a look, 
therefore, at the relevant data protection regime.
D. Algorithmic decision-making 
and EU data protection
44 The use of algorithms is under the lens of the data 
protection authorities, especially with regards to 
profiling. The European Data Protection Supervisor157 
has pointed out that the problem is not profiling as 
such, but “the lack of meaningful information about 
the algorithmic logic which develops these profiles 
and has an effect on the data subject.”158
45 Under the Data Protection Directive,159 there is a right 
not to be subject to a decision which produces legal 
effects or significantly affects the data subjects, if 
the decision is based solely on automated processing 
of data aimed at evaluating certain personal aspects 
concerning them (e.g. creditworthiness). Moreover, 
there is a right to know the logic involved in any 
automated processing of data.160 Nonetheless, one 
155 SAS Institute IV (n 108).
156 Kamarinou (n 76) 23.
157 The European Data Protection Supervisor is the EU data 
protection authority. They inter alia ensure the protection 
of personal data and privacy when EU institutions and 
bodies process personal data. See Regulation (EC) No 
45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such 
data [2001] OJ L 8/1.
158 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Recommendations 
on the EU’s options for data protection reform’ (2015/C 
301/01), para 3.1.
159 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive), art 
15.
160 Data Protection Directive, art 12(a); recital 41. For a national 
implementation, see the UK Data Protection Act 1998, s 7(1)
may be subject to an algorithmic decision in two 
scenarios.161 Firstly, in the course of the entering into 
a contract (or of the performance thereof), provided 
the request for the entering into the contract (or the 
performance thereof), lodged by the data subject, 
has been satisfied or that there are suitable measures 
to safeguard his legitimate interests (e.g. the data 
subject could express their viewpoint). For instance, 
some law firms162 are using AI-enabled computer 
programs to assess the merits of personal injury 
cases and decide, therefore, whether to accept 
the case or to draft contingency fee agreements. 
Secondly, and more generally, algorithmic decision-
making may be authorised by a law, if there are 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate 
interests.163 Fraud and tax evasion prevention are 
the typical examples.164
46 The rules on algorithmic decision-making have been 
amended by the GDPR,165 which is set to come into 
effect on 25 May 2018, also in the UK, regardless of 
Brexit.166 The general principle is that data subjects 
should not be subject to algorithmic decisions. 
However, when non-human agents take a decision 
that has legal effects on the data subject’s life “or 
similarly significantly affects him or her,”167 the data 
subject has the rights to obtain human intervention, 
to express their point of view, as well as to contest 
the decision.168 Correspondingly, the data controller 
(d).
161 Data Protection Directive, art 15(2).
162 See Jane Croft, ‘Legal firms unleash office automatons’ 
(The Financial Times, 16 May 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/19807d3e-1765-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d.
163 In the UK, the Secretary of State may prescribe in which 
circumstances (apart from a contract) an algorithmic 
decision may be exempt from the said rules (Data Protection 
Act 1998, s 12(5)(b)).
164 Information Commissioner’s Office, Overview of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (ICO 2017) 27. The same 
example can be found in the GDPR, recital 71.
165 The underlying principle is the same, that is that “fully 
automated assessments of a person’s character should not 
form the sole basis of decisions that significantly impinge 
upon the person’s interests” (Lee Bygrave, ‘Automated 
Profiling, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data 
Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’ (2001) 17(1) 
Computer Law & Security Review 17, 21) as suggested by 
Kamarinou (n 76) 8.
166 In the time between 25 May 2018 and 29 March 2019 the 
rules about algorithmic decision-making will be those 
resulting from a combination of GDPR and the Data 
Protection Act, after 29 March 2019 it is likely that only 
the Data Protection Act as amended will be in force. cf 
The Rt Hon Karen Bradley MP, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, Oral evidence: Responsibilities of the Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport, HC 764 (24 October 2016).
167 GDPR, art 22.
168 As to the latter, it would seem to us that this right as 
enshrined in art 22 of the GDPR is the same as the right to 
“challenge the decision” under recital 71. Contra, see Kuner 
(n 76) 2, who observe that even though the recital is not 
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shall provide “meaningful information about the 
logic involved”169 in the algorithmic decision. It is 
likely that the national implementing measures of 
the Data Protection Directive will be amended or 
replaced to recognise a stronger protection to data 
subjects against algorithmic decisions.170
I. The general prohibition on 
solely automated decisions 
with a significant effect
47 Let us start with the provisions directly dealing 
with algorithmic decision-making;171 it is open to 
debate whether they constitute a considerable step 
forward. The main right available to the data subject 
is the right not to be subject to a solely automated 
decision with legal effects or similarly significantly 
affecting them.172 This can be interpreted as a 
general prohibition to make algorithmic decisions 
using personal data, or as a mere right to be oppose 
(after being informed about) the algorithmic 
decision.173 In the UK, data subjects can require 
binding, it “may embolden regulators and courts to try to 
compel data controllers to provide explanations of specific 
outcomes in particular cases, and not merely ‘meaningful 
information’ about ‘logic’”.
169 GDPR, arts 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g).
170 In August 2017, the UK government announced a new Data 
Protection Bill, where “individuals will have greater say in 
decisions that are made about them based on automated 
processing. Where decisions are based on solely automated 
processing individuals can request that processing 
is reviewed by a person rather than a machine.” (UK 
Department for Digital, Culture Media & Sport, A new data 
protection bill: Our planned reforms, The UK Government (7 
August 2017), <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/635900/2017-08-
07_DP_Bill_-_Statement_of_Intent.pdf> accessed 3 March 
2018). The Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 13 
September 2017 and it passed second reading at the House 
of Commons on 5 March 2018. Members of Parliament are 
considering the Bill in a Public Bill Committee, which is 
set to finish by 27 March 2018. See below for the analysis 
of s 14 of the Bill (as brought from the Lords), regarding 
algorithmic decision-making authorised by the law. It must 
be said that the fact that the only relevant provision in the 
Bill regards the limited issue of the algorithmic decisions 
authorised by law may be seen as a missed opportunity to 
thoroughly review the regime laid out in s 12 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998.
171 The focus of this section is on the rules regarding algorithmic 
decision-making. These do not apply to profiling per se 
if it is not followed by an algorithmic decision producing 
legal effects or similarly significantly affecting the data 
subject. For more information on the rules about profiling, 
regardless of whether or not it is followed by an algorithmic 
decision, please see ibid 17-25.
172 GDPR, art 22(1).
173 For the first interpretation, in favour of a general 
prohibition of algorithmic decisions, see the French Loi n° 
78-17 of 6 January 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et 
that no solely algorithmic decision be taken against 
them. However, if no such notice has effect and 
the decision is taken, the data controller has 21 
days to give a written notice explaining the steps 
that they will take to comply with the data subject 
request.174 Positively, in issuing some guidelines 
on algorithmic decision-making, the Article 29 
Working Party175 recommends treating this right as 
a general prohibition.176 Regrettably, however, the 
only amendment introduced by the Data Protection 
Bill with regards to algorithmic decisions concerns 
the safeguarding measures that controllers should 
take when availing themselves of the consent-based 
exception.177 Arguably, by refusing the “general 
prohibition” approach, the UK will not comply with 
the GDPR, with practical consequences for instance 
in terms of the legality of the EU-UK data transfers. 
If this provision expresses a core data protection 
principle,178 a partial compliance may cause the EU to 
deem the UK protection of personal data inadequate, 
hence hindering cross-border data flows.179
48 Looking at the core of art 22, there are two main 
differences between the Data Protection Directive 
and the GDPR.
49 First, in the new provision there is an express 
reference to profiling as an example of automated 
processing. This brings clarity in a field currently 
perceived as particularly relevant, but it risks 
aux libertés, art 10.
174 Data Protection Act 1998, s 12(3).
175 The Article 29 Working Party is an advisory body set up 
under the Data Protection Directive, art 29. It is composed 
by representatives from the Member States’ data protection 
authorities, the European Data Protection Supervisor and 
the European Commission. The GDPR will replace it with the 
European Data Protection Board.
176 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 12.
177 Other Member States are adopting implementing measures 
that are overlooking algorithmic decision-making. For 
instance, on 21 March 2018, the Italian Cabinet (Consiglio 
dei Ministri) adopted the draft decree implementing the 
GDPR (Disposizioni per l’adeguamento della normativa nazionale 
alle disposizioni del Regolamento (UE) 2016/679 del Parlamento 
europeo e del Consiglio, del 27 aprile 2016, relativo alla protezione 
delle persone fisiche con riguardo al trattamento dei dati 
personali, nonché alla libera circolazione di tali dati, e che abroga 
la direttiva 95/46/CE (Regolamento generale sulla protezione dei 
dati), hereinafter ‘Draft GDPR implementing decree’). The 
Draft GDPR implementing decree does not provide anything 
on the matter. Unlike the UK, however, the GDPR will be 
directly applicable and, therefore, Italian data controllers 
will be bound directly by art 22 of the GDPR.
178 This is the view expressed by Bygrave (n 165) 22 about 
the similar provision in the Data Protection Directive. His 
observation is all the more true with regards to the GDPR 
for at least two reasons. First, because algorithmic decisions 
have become more common and more intrusive. Second, 
because the GDPR strengthens the relevant regime, thus 
confirming the importance of the provision.
179 GDPR, art 45.
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narrowing the interpretation of the provision 
thus excluding forms of algorithmic decision-
making which do not include profiling. Therefore, 
it is positive that the Article 29 Working Party has 
observed that “(a)utomated decisions can be made 
with or without profiling; profiling can take place 
without making automated decisions.”180
50 Second, and most importantly, one has the said right 
only if the decision produces legal effects concerning 
one “or similarly significantly affects him or her.”181 
This addition goes in the opposite direction to the 
one taken when the draft GDPR was first published 
and it had been suggested that art 22 should cover 
not only decisions producing legal effects or which 
significantly affect data subjects, but also the 
“collection of data for the purpose of profiling and 
the creation of profiles as such.”182
51 Now, “legal effect” is quite straightforward, 
including all the scenarios where a decision affects a 
person’s rights based on laws or contracts.183 In turn, 
“similarly” may narrow the scope of the provision, 
if compared with the previous wording, where no 
reference to this adverb was made. Indeed, it may be 
seen as meaning that one does not have the right to 
object to algorithmic decision-making if the effect is 
not similar to a legal effect184 (e.g. significant distress 
or missed professional opportunities as a consequence 
of being permanently banned from a popular social 
network).185 If this interpretation were followed, 
broader national implementations may need to be 
reviewed accordingly. For instance, the UK refers to 
decisions take for “the purpose of evaluating matters 
relating to him such as, for example, his performance 
at work, his creditworthiness, his reliability or his 
conduct”186. The Information Commissioner’s Office 
accepts that it is hard to explain what “significant 
effect” means, but it suggests that it refers to “some 
consequence that is more than trivial and potentially 
has an unfavourable outcome.”187 Businesses have 
180 ibid 8.
181 GDPR, art 22(1).
182 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Advice paper on essential 
elements of a definition and a provision on profiling within 
the EU General Data Protection Regulation’ (13 May 2013), 
para 2(a).
183 cf ibid 10.
184 This would constitute a weakening of many national 
implementing regimes. For instance, in the UK the Data 
Protection Act 1998 refers generally to decisions which 
significantly affect the individual (s 12(1)).
185 cf Jilian York, ‘Getting banned from Facebook can have 
unexpected and professionally devastating consequences’ 
(Quartz, 31 March 2016) <https://qz.com/651001/getting-
banned-from-facebook-can-have-unexpected-and-
professionally-devastating-consequences/> accessed 1 
March 2018. 
186 Data Protection Act 1998, s 12(1).
187 Information Commissioner’s Office, Feedback request – 
been asking for more detailed guidance188 and this 
has partly arrived with the Article 29 Working 
Party’s guidelines that indicated that “similarly” 
means that “the threshold for significance must be 
similar.”189 Therefore, in order for a decision to fall 
within the scope of art 22, it must not necessarily 
be a quasi-legal effect in terms of content, being 
sufficient a decision which profoundly affects the 
individual as much as a decision affecting her or 
his rights would. Adding details to the UK attempt 
of definition, the EU advisory body point out that 
a similarly significant effect must be “more than 
trivial and must be sufficiently great or important 
to be worthy of attention.”190 The concept is broad 
enough to encompass a vast number of scenarios, 
from e-recruiting to online behavioural advertising, 
especially if intrusive and targeted to vulnerable 
groups,191 as well as consumer manipulation.192
52 Even before understanding what ‘legal’ means, 
one should clarify what a ‘decision’ is. It has been 
suggested that this could include “an interim 
or individual step taken during the automated 
processing.”193 It would seem, however, that only 
rarely interim measures and individual steps will 
qualify for the application of art 22 of the GDPR, 
because the provision requires a decision with legal 
effect or “similarly significant.”
53 Some aspects of this regime are not clear yet. 
For instance, it is open to debate what solely 
automated means. In the past, it was relatively easy 
to understand what ‘solely’ meant. There was a 
limited number of organisations taking significant 
algorithmic decisions and the technologies used were 
profiling and automated decision-making (ICO 2017) 19.
188 The digital technology industry in Europe would welcome 
such guidance. For instance, ‘Input on Automated 
Individual Decision Making & Data Breach Notification’ 
(DigitalEurope, 5 April 2017) 3 <http://www.digitaleurope.
org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.
aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=2390&languag
e=en-US&PortalId=0&TabId=353> accessed 1 March 2018, 
“would appreciate (…) clarification in the future guidance 
on how companies should interpret these two cumulative 
conditions as well as examples of such effects in different 
sectors”.
189 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 10.
190 ibid 10.
191 cf Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Some considerations on intelligent 
online behavioural advertising’ (2017) 66-67 Revue du droit 
des technologies de l’information 53.
192 Artificial intelligence is increasingly used to predict 
consumers’ behaviour in order to lock them in by means 
of addiction. Evidence has been recently uncovered about 
such manipulating practices in the gambling industry. 
See Mattha Busby, ‘Revealed: how bookies use AI to keep 
gamblers hooked’ (The Guardian, 30 April 2014) <https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/30/bookies-
using-ai-to-keep-gamblers-hooked-insiders-say> accessed 2 
May 2018.
193 ibid 12.
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quite rudimental; therefore, reviewing the machine-
generated data was relatively straightforward 
and once a human being reviewed the data, the 
decision was no longer solely automated.194 In light 
of increasingly complex (and accordingly opaque) 
algorithmic techniques and of the ubiquitous nature 
of the phenomenon of algorithmic decisions, that 
approach should be abandoned. To what extent is 
the human intervention meaningful vis-á-vis black-
box decisions?
54 The UK Information Commissioner’s Office recently 
requested feedback on some points of the GDPR,195 
and they have suggested that ‘solely’ should “cover 
those automated decision-making processes where 
a human exercises no real influence on the outcome 
of the decision, for example where the result of the 
profiling or process is not assessed by a person before 
being formalised as a decision.”196 The risk of this 
interpretation is that it is not always easy - especially 
from the data subject’s perspective - which role the 
human being played in the decision (was the human 
being a passive operator? Which discretion did they 
have while assessing the result?). Moreover, “it may 
not be feasible for a human to conduct a meaningful 
review of a process that may have involved third-
party data and algorithms (which may contain trade 
secrets), prelearned models, or inherently opaque 
machine learning technique.”197 Therefore, it would 
seem more appropriate to recognise the right not to 
be subject to an algorithmic decision every time that 
there is not a human being clearly taking the final 
decision.198 It would seem that the Article 29 Working 
Party hold similar views when they state that a 
decision is not wholly automated when alongside an 
automated profile, there is “additional meaningful 
intervention carried out by humans before any 
decision is applied to an individual.”199 However, 
there is still a lack of clarity. Indeed, in order to 
clarify when art 22 GDPR applies or not, the Article 
29 Working Party makes the following examples. If 
a human decides whether to agree the loan based 
on a profile produced by purely automated means, 
then art 22 will not apply. In turn, if an algorithm 
decides whether the loan is agreed and the decision 
is automatically delivered to the individual, without 
194 This is still the approach that one can find in Information 
Commissioner’s Office, ‘Guide to Data Protection’ 
(ICO, 11 May 2016) <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1998/29/pdfs/ukpgaod_19980029_en.pdf> accessed 
18 March 2018.
195 Information Commissioner’s Office (n 186).
196 ibid 19.
197 Kuner (n 76) 2.
198 Along the same lines, with regards to the Data Protection 
Directive, it has been noted that the regime will operate 
every time that there is not a human being exercising “real 
influence on the outcome of a particular decision-making 
process” (Bygrave (n 165) 20).
199 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 8.
any meaningful human input, then art 22 will apply. 
The point is that there is a substantial grey area here. 
For instance, it is unclear whether art 22 applies 
when the algorithmic system takes the decision, 
but a human being reviews it. Arguably, the human 
review could qualify as “meaningful human input”, 
but this will have to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis.
55 Even more importantly, controllers should refrain 
from “fabricating human involvement”200 with the 
purpose of sidestepping art 22; this provision will 
apply every time that there is not meaningful and 
genuine human intervention, for instance in the 
form of actual oversight by a person with “authority 
and competence to change the decision.”201 It is 
important to stress that the GDPR applies to every 
automated profiling carried out on personal data 
to evaluate a natural person’s personal aspects, not 
only to the ‘solely’ automated one, which means 
that the general GDPR rules and standards will 
apply to profiling even when a human being plays 
a substantial role in the creation of the relevant 
profile.202
II. Three exceptions: 
contract, consent, law
56 Even though “as a rule, there is a prohibition on 
fully automated individual decision-making (…) 
that has a legal or similarly significant effect,”203 this 
rule has some exceptions. The GDPR has innovated 
the systems of the exceptions not only by adding 
a consent-based exception, but also by clarifying 
the scope of the pre-existing ones. It is unfortunate 
that the UK Data Protection Bill204 is missing out on 
this opportunity. Indeed, the only innovation that 
it is being introduced regards algorithmic decisions 
authorised by law. The UK will keep allowing 
such decisions in circumstances prescribed by the 
Secretary of State, in relation to a contract, when 
authorised or required by or under any enactment, 
effect of the decision is to grant a request of the 
data subject, or when steps have been taken to 
safeguard the legitimate interests of the data subject. 
200 ibid 10. As an example, they observe that “if someone 
routinely applies automatically generated profiles to 
individuals without any actual influence on the result, 
this would still be a decision based solely on automated 
processing.” (ibid 10).
201 ibid 10.
202 ibid 6. For instance, profiling is rarely transparent. However, 
the controller must provide data subjects with concise, 
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible information 
about the processing of their personal data (GDPR, art 
12(1)).
203 ibid 9.
204 Data Protection Bill [HL] 2017-19, s 14.
2018
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No consent-based exception is provided. Unlike 
the interpretation of the right not to be subject to 
an algorithmic decision as a general prohibition, 
the lack of implementation of the consent-based 
exception is unlikely to endanger the cross-border 
data transfers with the EU. Indeed, a lack thereof 
might ensure a stronger protection of personal 
data. In turn, the broad wording of the contractual 
exception may be more problematic.205
57 Art 22 brings clarity to the scenario regarding 
the entering and performance of the contract 
by simplifying the language and restricting the 
contractual exception to the instances when the 
algorithmic decision-making is necessary to enter 
into a contract or for its performance.206 One may 
argue, going back to the example of the contingency 
fee agreements, that in that scenario the algorithmic 
decision would not be necessary and, thus, it would 
not fall within the scope of this exception. Following 
the European Data Protection Supervisor’s approach, 
if a less privacy-intrusive method is available, then 
the algorithmic decision is not necessary and, 
therefore, it is not allowed.207
58 In turn, the new exception based on the data subject’s 
explicit consent208 is problematic. Consent is explicit 
when there is “an express statement rather than 
some other affirmative action.”209 Indeed, given the 
imbalance of bargaining power that characterises 
many transactions, one should not be surprised if, 
for instance, a bank could force a potential client 
requesting a loan to consent to a decision taken by an 
algorithm. The exception based a law authorising the 
decision while laying down measures to safeguard 
the data subject’s legitimate interest210 now includes 
a reference to the data subject’s rights and freedoms 
and to both EU and national law. These changes are 
nugatory. Firstly, based on an a minore ad maius 
argument, it is obvious that if the decision shall 
respect the legitimate interests of the data subject, 
205 The Data Protection Act 1998 enables data controllers to 
make algorithmic decisions in the course of steps taken 
for the purpose of considering whether to enter into a 
contract, with a view to entering into such a contract, or in 
the course of performing such a contract, or if the decision 
is authorised or required by or under any enactment (Data 
Protection Act 1998, s 12(6)).
206 GDPR, art 22(2)(a).
207 cf European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Assessing the 
necessity of measures that limit the fundamental right to 
the protection of personal data. A Toolkit’ (European Data 
Protection Supervisor, 11 April 2017), <https://edps.europa.
eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-04-11_necessity_
toolkit_en_0.pdf> accessed 9 March 2018.
208 GDPR, art 22(2)(c).
209 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 13. These guidelines do 
not provide sufficient clarity as to how to ensure explicit 
consent. The matter will be addressed in the forthcoming 
consent guidelines.
210 GDPR, art 22(2)(b).
it shall do so also with regards to the more relevant 
rights and freedoms. Secondly, while the reference 
to national laws is a truism, the one to EU law cannot 
be interpreted as a power to legislate beyond what 
already provided by the treaties.  However, the 
growth of artificial intelligence (AI) may have an 
impact on the analysed regime. Not only because, 
generally, AI does not always make it feasible to 
access the rationale of algorithmic decisions. With 
specific regards to the consent-based exception, 
it is fair to wonder, “how can informed consent 
be obtained in relation to a process that may be 
inherently non-transparent (a ‘black box’).”211
59 The third exception regards national and EU laws 
authorising algorithmic decisions.212 Regrettably, the 
Article 29 Working Party do not provide any guidance 
on the matter. Whereas recital 71 refers only to 
fraud, tax evasion, and reliability of the service, it 
would seem that EU and national authorities may 
allow algorithmic decisions for a potentially infinite 
number of purposes. Indeed, recital 73 provides 
that EU and national laws can impose restrictions 
concerning “decisions based on profiling” in inter 
alia order to prevent or react to breaches of ethics 
for regulated professions or for the keeping of 
public registers kept for reasons of public interest. 
Therefore, for instance, a Member State could allow 
algorithmic decisions to disbar a barrister who 
behaved unethically. Nor are there limits to which 
kind of public registers a state may keep, for instance 
for surveillance purposes.213 One should not think, 
however, that if a law authorises the algorithmic-
decision making in a specific field, say fraud, data 
protection legislation can be eluded altogether. 
Alongside the rights to access, the information rights 
and right to a human judge, data controllers will still 
have to comply with all the other data protection 
principles, including accountability.214 The Data 
Protection Directive required the laws authorising 
algorithmic decisions to safeguard only the data 
subjects’ legitimate interests and not also their rights 
211 Kuner (n 76) 1.
212 GDPR, art 22(2)(b).
213 Nonetheless, the restrictions should be necessary and 
proportionate in a democratic society to safeguard public 
security and in compliance with Charter and in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.
214 The GDPR provides that the algorithmic decision-making 
for purposes authorised by EU or national law should be 
“conducted in accordance with the regulations, standards 
and recommendations of Union institutions or national 
oversight bodies.” (recital 71). Even though it may be 
interpreted as referring only to fraud and tax evasion, it 
would be absurd to exclude other purposes specifically 
authorised by the law (the reference is illustrative, not 
exhaustive). It is submitted that the data protection 
authorities should be deemed as oversight bodies and 
the data protection laws should still apply even when an 
algorithmic decision is allowed.
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and freedoms. Moreover, it did not specify which 
laws could authorise algorithmic decisions. The 
GDPR, in turn, now includes a reference to the data 
subject’s rights and freedoms and it clarifies that 
both EU and national laws can authorise algorithmic 
decisions. Arguably, these changes are nugatory. 
Firstly, based on an a minore ad maius argument, it 
is obvious that if the decision should respect the 
legitimate interests, all the more it should do so with 
rights and freedoms. Secondly, the clarification that 
national law can be a legal basis is a truism. So is the 
one about EU law, which should not be interpreted 
as a power to legislate beyond what already provided 
by the treaties.
60 The UK Data Protection Bill215 provides more detail 
as to the procedure to follow when an algorithmic 
decision falls under the third exception. Indeed, the 
controller must, as soon as reasonably practicable, 
notify the data subject in writing that a decision has 
been taken based solely on automated processing. 
Correspondingly, the data subject may, before 
the end of the period of 21 days, beginning with 
receipt of the notification, request the controller 
to reconsider the decision, or take a new decision 
that is not based solely on automated processing. 
The provision goes on to point out what the 
controller must do if such request is made. The 
procedure is the same that the Data Protection Act 
currently provides for non-exempt decisions, but 
interestingly the new regime is more protective of 
the data subject if compared to the previous one. 
Indeed, currently the data controller’s notice must 
only indicate the steps the controller intends to 
take to comply with the request. This information 
must be notified before the end of the period of 21 
days beginning with receipt of the request. On top 
of this, the Data Protection Bill provides that when 
the law authorises an algorithmic decision, the data 
controller shall consider the request, comply with 
it, and inform the data subject of the steps taken to 
comply, and of the outcome of complying with the 
request. The wording suggests that data controllers 
have some discretion in complying. However, the 
discretion regards how to comply, not whether 
to comply. The only reason why a denial could be 
allowed would be if the algorithmic decision was not 
taken solely on the basis of automated processing, 
if the decision does not significantly affect the data 
subject, or if it is impossible to identify the data 
subject.216 If the data controller violated the limits 
of its discretion, the data subject may appeal the 
decision judicially.
215 Data Protection Bill [HL] 2017-19, s 14.
216 The GDPR is very clear in stressing that the data controller 
“shall not refuse to act on the request of the data subject for 
exercising his or her rights under Articles 15 to 22, unless 
the controller demonstrates that it is not in a position to 
identify the data subject” (art 12(2).
61 Interpreters will need to avoid a visible inconsistency 
in the new UK regime on algorithmic decision-
making. Namely, it is not rational to give the data 
subject a weaker protection when a non-exempt 
decision is at issue, if compared to a decision 
authorised by the law.
62 One may observe a departure of UK data protection 
law from the GDPR. In the UK, there is a three-layered 
system. As a rule, data subjects must be informed of 
non-exempt algorithmic decisions and can request 
that no such decision be taken. If no request has 
effect, they still have a right to be informed and 
to request a reconsideration or a human decision. 
Reconsideration and the right to a human judge, 
after the Data Protection Bill is enacted, will apply 
also to the algorithmic decisions authorised by law. 
Obviously, no right to pre-empt such a decision 
would apply. Thirdly, data subjects have no rights 
regarding the other exempt decisions.217 This may 
raise concerns in terms of adequacy of the protection 
of personal data in the UK in the context of cross-
border data transfer with the EU. Since consent is 
not one of the exceptions, the rights of the first layer 
will apply. In the EU, in turn, there is a clearer and 
stronger model. The rule is the general prohibition 
to take solely algorithmic decisions. There are only 
three justifications that can be used to make some 
decisions, but all of them are accompanied by strong 
safeguards for the data subject.
63 Lastly, it is not entirely clear if the list of exceptions 
(contract, consent, law) is exhaustive. A recital218 
refers to algorithmic decision-making for the 
purpose of ensuring the security and reliability of 
a service provided by the controller. However, this 
should not be interpreted as a fourth exception or 
as proof of the non-exhaustive character of the list 
of exceptions. It is plausible, indeed, that this is only 
an example of a purpose for which national and EU 
laws can authorise the said decision-making.219
III. Measures to safeguard the 
data subjects’ rights, freedoms, 
and legitimate interests
64 The main commendable innovation in the GDPR 
regards the measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests affected by 
217 Under the Data Protection Act, s 12(4), the data subject’s 
request not to take solely algorithmic decisions does not 
have effect in relation to an exempt decision; and nothing 
in s 12(2), regarding the data controller’s notice, applies to 
an exempt decision.
218 GDPR, recital 71.
219 See Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 12.
2018
Guido Noto La Diega
22 1
an algorithmic decision.220
65 First, now these measures refer also to the 
contractual and consent-based exceptions. Second, 
they are no longer limited to the right to express 
one’s viewpoint. The provision shall be interpreted 
as the right to obtain human intervention on the 
part of the controller and the right to contest the 
decision. Therefore, if there is a law authorising 
algorithmic decision making,221 if this is necessary 
for a contract, or if there is the data subject’s explicit 
consent, a data controller may use algorithms to take 
decisions having legal effects or similarly affecting 
the data subject. However, data controllers shall 
put in place a procedure to appeal the decision with 
meaningful oversight by a human being that shall 
ensure an effective right of defence to the data 
subject.222
66 This is a major victory for those who think that 
human decision-making is still better than the 
automated one.223 However, it is unclear which 
steps the data controller should take once the data 
subjects avail themselves of the analysed remedy. 
The Article 29 Working Party further clarify that the 
review must be carried out by a human being with 
appropriate authority and capability to change the 
decision and who shall thoroughly assess “all the 
relevant data, including any additional information 
provided by the data subject.”224
220 GDPR, art 22(3).
221 The wording of the provision is not crystal clear. Indeed, 
art 22(2)(b) applies the said measures to the algorithmic 
decision-making authorised by the law. Then, the following 
paragraph extends these measures to the other two 
exceptions and it specifies that they include “at least” the 
right to human intervention, to express the viewpoint, and 
to contest the decision. It may be argued, therefore, that 
when the law authorises algorithmic decision-making, the 
mere right to express one’s viewpoint (as provided under 
the old regime) would be sufficient. However, this would 
seem to go against the overall purpose of the GDPR and of 
art 22. Moreover, the express reference to “at least” is likely 
to mean that those three rights are the minimum core of the 
measures that safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms, 
and legitimate interests. Furthermore, recital 71 suggests 
that these measures should be put in place “[i]n any case”.
222 Obviously, if such a system is not in place or if the data 
subject is not satisfied, the usual judicial remedies will be 
available.
223 A slightly different perspective is taken by Kamarinou (n 76) 
22, who observe that “it may already in some contexts make 
sense to replace the current model, whereby individuals 
can appeal to a human against a machine decision, with the 
reverse model whereby individuals would have a right to 
appeal to a machine against a decision made by a human”.
224 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 15.
IV. Transparency obligations: 
a right to explanation?
67 Moving onto the transparency obligations, these 
are nearly entirely new,225 given that under the 
Data Protection Directive there was only the right 
to access, which included the logic involved in the 
algorithmic decision.226 Innovatively, the processing 
is not deemed fair and transparent, if the controller 
does not - at the time when personal data is 
obtained from the data subject - provide specific 
information on three matters.227 First, controllers 
must disclose the existence of algorithmic decision-
making. Second, they need to inform the data subject 
about the logic involved. Third, the algorithm 
must be opened in order to provide “meaningful 
information about […] the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing for the 
data subject.”228 The same right applies when the 
data was not obtained from the data subject, who 
has the right to be informed within a reasonable 
timeframe229 (at the latest within one month),230 at 
the time of the first communication with the data 
subject,231 or when the data is fist disclosed to a 
third party.232 Data controllers who merely make 
the information available, without actively bringing 
it to the data subject’s attention, do not meet their 
transparency obligations. On top of the obligation 
to inform, there is the right of access, which again 
regards the existence of the algorithmic decision-
making itself and meaningful information about the 
logic, the significance, and the consequences.233
68 One should welcome positively the obligation 
to provide (and the right to access) meaningful 
information and the reference to the envisaged 
consequences and significance of the decision. While 
225 They are new at an EU level, but not necessarily at the 
national one. For instance, the Data Protection Act 1998 
provides the controller’s obligation to notify the data 
subject that the decision was algorithmic (s 12(2)(a)), unless 
the data subject already required that the decision is not 
taken based solely on automated processing (s 12(1)-(2)).
226 Data Protection Directive, art 12(a).
227 Information rights exist under the GDPR also when there is 
no algorithmic decision significantly affecting a data subject. 
See the principles of fair and transparent processing and 
arts 13 and 14 of the GDPR. According to Article 29 Working 
Party (n 9) 13 considers as “good practice to provide the 
above information whether or not the processing falls 
within the narrow Article 22(1) definition.”
228 GDPR, art 13(2)(f).
229 This is similar to the UK provision, which refers to “as soon 
as reasonably practicable” (Data Protection Act 1998, s 12(2)
(a)).
230 GDPR, art 14(3)(a).
231 GDPR, art 14(3)(b).
232 GDPR, art 14(3)(c).
233 GDPR, art 15(1)(h).
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“envisaged” suggests that information must be 
provided “about intended or future processing,”234 
it would seem that “significance” requires real, 
tangible examples of how the decision may affect 
the data subject.235
69 Generally speaking, such meaningful information 
is what the data subject, who normally will not be 
a computer scientist, is likely to be interested in. 
Therefore, for instance, a technical document which 
includes the algorithm used and the mere explanation 
of the logic in mathematical terms will not in itself 
meet the legal requirement. Arguably, this should 
be interpreted as the disclosure of the algorithm 
with an explanation in non-technical terms of the 
rationale of the decision and criteria relied upon.236 
Regrettably, the Article 29 Working Party237 do not 
consider the disclosure of the algorithm as necessary 
under the said transparency obligations. However, 
in order to have a full picture, the data subject has a 
legitimate interest in asking an expert to analyse the 
algorithm in order to better challenge the decision. A 
different interpretation would not comply with right 
to an effective remedy238 and to a fair trial239 under 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
70 Obviously, it may be the case that, due to the 
characteristics of artificial intelligence alone, it could 
be impossible to explain an algorithmic process “in a 
way that is intelligible to a data subject.”240 However, 
the data controller should make any reasonable 
effort to adequately inform the data subject.
71 Scholars have recently criticised the provision 
because it would entail a right to be informed, but 
no right to explanation.241 Others,242 conversely, have 
234 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 14.
235 ibid 14.
236 ibid.
237 This is the interpretation given to recital 60 of the GDPR by 
Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 13.
238 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art 
47(1); European Convention on Human Rights, art 13.
239 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art 
47(2); European Convention on Human Rights, art 6.
240 Kuner (n 76) 1, who suggest that a “high-level, non-
technical, description of the decision-making process is 
more likely to be meaningful” (ibid 2).
241 Sandra Wachter et al., ‘Why a Right to Explanation of 
Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General 
Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7(2) International Data 
Privacy Law 76. For a similar somehow pessimistic take, see 
Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the algorithm? 
Why a ‘right to an explanation’ is probably not the remedy 
you are looking for’ (2017) 16(1) Duke Law & Technology 
Review 18.
242 Gianclaudio Malgieri and Giovanni Comandé, ‘Why a Right 
to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the 
General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7(4) International 
Data Privacy Law 243. On the optimistic front, see also Julia 
pointed out that Articles 15 and 22 should have a 
wide interpretation that might prove adequate to 
cope with the transparency challenge; they propose 
a legibility stress test for the data controller.
72 To overcome this issue, those who exclude that 
a right to explanation is provided by the GDPR 
make a number of recommendations to improve 
transparency and accountability of algorithmic 
decision-making, including a trusted third-party 
regulatory or supervisory body that can investigate 
algorithmic decisions if one feels that they have 
been discriminated against. Whereas the idea of an 
AI watchdog can be a positive one, this paper argues 
that the information rights provided with regards 
to algorithmic decision-making – which include a 
reference to the significance and consequences of 
the decision – can be interpreted as meaning a right 
to explanation.243 Denying it would mean playing 
down the great potential of legal interpretation. A 
counterargument could be that the wording ‘right 
to obtain information’ can be found in recital 71, 
but not in art 22; this placement in a non-binding 
part of the Regulation (a recital) has been seen as 
“a purposeful change deliberated in trilogue.”244 
However, the pivotal role of recitals in interpreting 
the provisions of an EU act has been expressly 
recognised by the Commission.245 The reference 
to the right of explanation in the recital shall be, 
therefore, used to properly construe art 22 to reflect 
the context of the provision and the overall purpose 
of the GDPR, that is increasing the protection of the 
data subjects’ rights. Hence, even though applying 
the literal rule, art 22 would not contain a right to 
explanation, a purposive approach and a correct 
valorisation of the role of recitals make it clear 
that data subjects are entitled to such a right. In 
addition, the data controller is expressly required to 
provide “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language.”246
Powles and Hal Hodson, ‘Google DeepMind and healthcare 
in an age of algorithms’ (2017) 7 Health Technol 351. 
Between the two poles, see e.g. Tal Zarsky, ‘The Trouble with 
Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine 
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision 
Making’ (2016) 41(1) Science, Technology, & Human Values 
118; Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘The New Imbroglio - Living with 
Machine Algorithms’, in Liisa Janssens (ed) The Art of Ethics 
in the Information Society (Amsterdam University Press 2016).
243 There is the risk, however, that the courts will interpret 
the analysed provisions in a narrow way, focusing on the 
weaknesses of the new regime.
244 Wachter (n 238) 96.
245 Roberto Baratta, ‘Complexity of EU law in the domestic 
implementing process’ (2014) 19th Quality of legislation 
seminar “EU legislative drafting: Views from those applying 
EU law in the Member States” 4 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
legal_service/seminars/20140703_baratta_speech.pdf> 
accessed 1 March 2018.
246 GDPR, art 12(1).
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73 Lastly and commendably, the GDPR details the 
timescale and procedure to provide information.247 
In particular, the information should be provided 
without undue delay and in any event248 within one 
month of receipt of the request. The information 
must be in electronic form to reflect the form of the 
request, unless the data subject requests otherwise.
74 Obviously, the problems with the black boxes remain, 
no matter how broad the interpretation given to 
the transparency obligations is. Therefore, the 
transparency obligations may not be fully effective 
“in cases where a machine learning process involves 
multiple data sources, dynamic development, and 
elements that are opaque, whether for technological 
or proprietary reasons.”249
V. Algorithmic decisions with 
sensitive personal data
75 Another positive new provision regards sensitive 
personal data (e.g. data on health or sexuality). 
Artificial intelligence increasingly relies on this 
kind of data. One need only think that deep neural 
networks have been recently used to infer the sexual 
orientation of people from their faces.250 Indeed, in 
principle, algorithmic decisions shall not be based on 
sensitive personal data.251 For instance, an employer 
may not let an algorithm decide whether to fire an 
employee using health data. However, this data may 
be used with the data subject’s explicit consent or in 
the interest of public health, provided that measures 
to safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms, and 
legitimate interests are in place. Even though ideally 
it would have been preferable not to have another 
consent-based exception, unlike the homologous 
exception regarding non-sensitive personal data, 
here it is provided that EU or national laws can 
decide that the prohibition to process sensitive data 
“may not be lifted by the data subject.”252
247 GDPR, art 12(3).
248 If the data controller proves that more time is necessary to 
respond because the request is very complex and there is a 
high number of requests, there may be an extension by two 
further months. See GDPR, art 12(3).
249 Kuner (n 76) 2.
250 Yilun Wang and Michal Kosinski, ‘Deep neural networks are 
more accurate than humans at detecting sexual orientation 
from facial images’ (OSFHome, 15 February 2017) <https://
osf.io/zn79k/> accessed 1 March 2018 (forthcoming in 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology).
251 GDPR, art 22(4).
252 GDPR, art 9(2)(a).
VI. Data Protection Impact 
Assessments for 
algorithmic decisions
76 Lastly, one of the main innovations of the GDPR is the 
data protection impact assessment (DPIA).253 These 
impact assessments are tools for organisations to 
manage data protection hazards, a form of a form 
of ‘meta-regulation’ whereby “state efforts to 
make corporations responsible and accountable 
for their own efforts to self-regulate.”254 In this 
field, DPIAs are “a way of showing that suitable 
measures have been put in place to address those 
risks (associated to algorithmic decision-making) 
and demonstrate compliance with the GDPR.”255 It 
is commendable that DPIAs are mandatory when 
a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal 
aspects is based on automated processing, and on 
which decisions are based that produce legal effects 
or similarly significantly affect a natural person.256 
Commendably, DPIAs are required both when the 
decision is wholly automated and when there is 
human intervention, not only when it is solely based 
on automated processing.257
VII. Can children be subject 
to algorithmic decisions?
77 An example of poor drafting regards the algorithmic 
decision-making concerning children. Hidden in a 
long recital, one finds the obscure sentence “[s]uch 
measure should not concern a child.”258
78 Naturally, one would think that children cannot 
be subject to algorithmic decisions. However, the 
sentence follows the one that regards the measures 
to safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms, and 
legitimate interests. Therefore, it may be interpreted 
as meaning that these safeguarding measures do 
not apply to children, who could nonetheless be 
253 See Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether 
processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the 
purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (European Commission, 
4 April 2017), <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.
cfm?doc_id=44137> accessed 7 March 2018.
254 This is the theory of Reuben Binns, ‘Data protection 
impact assessments: a meta-regulatory approach’ (2017) 
7(1) International Data Privacy Law 22, 23. The notion of 
meta-regulation was developed by C Parker, ‘Meta-regulation: 
Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in 
D McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law (CUP 2007) 29.
255 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 27.
256 GDPR, art 35(3)(a).
257 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 27.
258 GDPR, recital 71.
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subject to algorithmic decisions. This is obviously 
against the purpose of the GDPR, which provides an 
advanced protection to children. The doctrine of 
noscitur a sociis would lead to absurd consequences; 
therefore, a purposive approach should prevail. 
Thus, children should never be subject to algorithmic 
decision-making.
79 Regrettably, the Article 29 Working Party does not 
see this provision as an absolute prohibition, since 
the wording of the recital is not reflected in art 22. 
However, they recommend that “wherever possible, 
controllers should not rely upon the exceptions in 
art 22(2) to justify”259 algorithmic decision-making 
affecting children. Nonetheless, such decisions may 
be necessary for instance to protect the children’s 
welfare, in which case data controllers may resort 
to the exceptions. Positively, in turn, it is suggested 
that ‘legal effect’ and ‘similarly significant effect’ 
be interpreted broadly, because “solely automated 
decision making which influences a child’s choices 
and behaviour could potentially have a legal or 
similarly significant effect on them, depending 
upon the nature of the choices and behaviours in 
question.”260 Similarly, organisations must put in 
place safeguards tailored to the specific needs and 
features of the child.261
VIII. Collective algorithmic decisions
80 It is unclear, then, what happens to collective 
algorithmic decisions (e.g. to charge a higher rate of 
car insurance to the citizens associated to a particular 
postcode). Indeed, it has been questioned “whether 
data subjects are protected against decisions that 
have significant effects on them but are based on 
group profiling.”262 In general, the stress on the 
shift from individual to collective privacy should be 
welcomed.263 With regards to collective algorithmic 
decisions, it would seem that art 22 “does not limit 
‘profiling’ as such to individual profiling but only 
requires that the decision based on such profiling is 
addressed to an individual, in a way that has legal or 
significant effects for him/her as an individual.”264 
Therefore, collective profiling is covered by the 
GDPR when used for individual decisions.
259 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 26.
260 ibid 26.
261 ibid 26.
262 Kamarinou (n 76) 10.
263 Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Personal data for decisional 
purposes in the age of analytics: From an individual to 
a collective dimension of Data Protection’ (2016) 32(2) 
Computer Law & Security Review 238.
264 Kamarinou (n 76) 10.
IX. Data portability, accountability, 
and data minimisation
81 Although the focus is on the provisions specifically 
dedicated to algorithmic decision-making, other 
rules and principles may affect it. One need only 
mention data portability, accountability, and data 
minimisation.
82 The right to data portability could be used to obtain 
not only information about the logic, significance, 
and consequences of the algorithmic decision, but 
also all “the personal data concerning him or her, 
which he or she has provided to a controller, in a 
structured, commonly used and machine-readable 
format.”265 One could use this right to export the 
profiles used for the algorithmic decision.
83 The principle of accountability, then, may play 
a positive role. Indeed, in order “to mitigate the 
risks of automated profiling we must look towards 
mechanisms that increase the accountability (both 
through ex ante screening of data mining applications 
for possible risks and ex post checking of results) and 
transparency of automated profiling.”266 In particular 
when relying on the consent-based exception, data 
controllers will have to document it carefully to 
prove that consent was explicit.
84 Certain rules should be interpreted broadly, taking 
into account the characteristics of the phenomenon 
at hand. For instance, data minimisation and data 
exclusion, if interpreted narrowly, “may reduce the 
accuracy of data mining and may deny us the data 
necessary to detect discrimination in automated 
profiling.”267 However, the principle of data 
minimisation means that data should be adequate, 
relevant, and limited to what is necessary in relation 
to the purposes for which they are processed.268 
Arguably, this does not mean that data controllers 
shall always collect as little data as possible. It means 
that the quantity must be related to the purpose, 
provided that the data are adequate. Arguably, the 
application of artificial intelligence to take decisions 
that have legal effects can justify the processing of 
large amounts of data, for at least two interwoven 
reasons. First, the more data are used to train the 
algorithm, the more accurate the output may be 
(big data are ‘necessary’ for the functioning of 
artificial intelligence). Second, the processing of 
a low quantity of data, leading to an inaccurate 
output, would be ‘inadequate’ if one has to take a 
decision with legal consequences (or which similarly 
significantly affects the individual).
265 GDPR, art 20.
266 Schermer (n 10) 52.
267 ibid 52.
268 GDPR, art 5(1)(c).
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X. Algorithmic decisions taken by 
EU institutions and bodies
85 A brief note, finally, on the algorithmic decision-
making carried out by the EU and its institutions 
and bodies (e.g. e-procurement and e-recruiting). 
The current rules269 are more or less the same as the 
ones laid out in the Data Protection Directive, with 
the right to be informed about the logic involved 
in the decision, the right not to be subject to it, 
and the data controller’s obligation to put in place 
measures to protect the data subject’s legitimate 
interests. The only exception recognised is the 
express authorisation by national law, EU law, or 
the European Data Protection Supervisor. In January 
2017, the Commission adopted a proposal for a new 
regulation on the processing of personal data by the 
EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.270 The 
draft provides the same rules as the GDPR as to the 
information rights (existence, logic, significance, 
consequences),271 right to access,272 right to not to 
be subject,273 and mandatory data protection impact 
assessment.274
XI. An overall assessment of the 
new data protection rules 
on algorithmic decisions
86 In conclusion, overall the GDPR strengthens the 
rules on algorithmic decision-making timidly and 
269 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free 
movement of such data, arts 13 and 19, recital 29.
270 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (hereinafter ‘draft 
regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data by the Union institutions’). 
For the Commission proposal, the first reading Position of 
the European Parliament and the General Approach of the 
Council, see Council of the EU 13436/17 of 30 October 2017.
271 Draft regulation on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
arts 15(2)(f) and 16(2)(f).
272 Draft regulation on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
art 17(1)(h).
273 Draft regulation on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
art 23.
274 Draft regulation on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
art 39.
with some significant flaws, though some positive 
elements have to be acknowledged. It may well 
be the case that, as it has been suggested, this 
regime will act as “legal incentives for technology 
producers to build accountability mechanisms into 
the technology.”275 It still holds true that even if 
Article 15 of the Data Protection Directive and Article 
22 of the GDPR show that the promise in terms of 
providing a counterweight to algorithmic decision-
making is tarnished by complexities and ambiguities, 
they nonetheless shall be regarded as expression of 
a core data protection principle to be embodied in 
all data protection instruments.276
87 Now, before moving on to the third legal route, 
one needs to take account of the relation between 
intellectual property and data protection. It has 
been shown above that the Software Directive can 
prevail on the Trade Secrets Directive. It remains to 
be assessed what happens if there is a clash between 
trade secrets (and, more generally, intellectual 
property rights) and the data subject’s rights. Under 
the GDPR, the right of access cannot ‘adversely 
affect the rights and freedoms of others,’277 which 
include ‘trade secrets or intellectual property and in 
particular the copyright protecting the software.’278 
However, this provision has been interpreted 
narrowly by the Article 29 Working Party that 
observe that intellectual property rights cannot 
be invoked to deny access or refuse to provide 
information to the data subject.279 In allowing 
the disclosure of an algorithm covered by a trade 
secret, however, courts shall dictate measures that 
safeguard the commercial value of the trade secret, 
for instance by preventing its further disclosure. It 
is important to note that intellectual property must 
be balanced with data protection only when it comes 
to the right of access. Conversely, it is submitted 
that, in principle, when it comes to the other data 
subject’s rights and data controller’s obligations, 
intellectual property will not be a valid legal basis 
for exceptions or limitations.
88 Another regime to take into account – and whose 
interplay with intellectual property and data 
protection remains partly unsolved – is freedom of 
information.
275 Chris Reed et al., ‘Responsibility, Autonomy and 
Accountability: Legal Liability for Machine Learning’ 
(Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 243/2016) 29 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2853462> 
accessed 1 March 2018.
276 Bygrave (n 165) 22.
277 GDPR, art 15(4).
278 GDPR, recital 63.
279 Article 29 Working Party (n 9) 17.
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E. Freedom of information and 
access to the algorithm. 
The Italian panorama
89 In 2015, the French Commission d’accès aux documents 
administratifs obliged the Direction générale des 
finances publiques to release the source code of the 
computer program used to estimate the income 
tax of natural persons.280More recently, the TAR 
Lazio,281 administrative court282 in Italy, stated 
that an algorithm is a digital administrative act 
and therefore, under the freedom of information 
regime, the citizens have the right to access it. This 
section critically analyses this ruling as a prism 
to understand the application of the freedom-of-
information regime to algorithmic decision-making.
90 Under the Italian Administrative Procedure Act,283 
citizens have the right to view administrative 
documents and extract a copy thereof, if they have 
a “direct, specific, and actual interest, corresponding 
to a legally-protected situation and linked to the 
document one intends to access.”284 The typical 
example would be an individual unhappy with the 
outcome of a public competition (e.g. to become 
notary public) and, therefore, demands to access the 
documents relevant to the competition. An important 
limitation of freedom of information regimes is that 
they can be actioned only against the State or other 
public bodies and with regards to administrative 
documents.285 The Government and the public bodies 
can lay out which documents cannot be accessed for 
a number of purposes listed in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, including privacy.286 However, there 
280 Commission d’accès aux documents administratifs, avis 
20144578 - 8 January 2015, <http://www.cada.fr/avis-
20144578,20144578.html> accessed 1 March 2018.
281 TAR Lazio, chamber III bis, 22 March 2017, No 3769.
282 These courts administer justice mainly when a citizen claim 
the violation of their legitimate interest by a public body.
283 Legge 7 August 1990, No 241 Nuove norme in materia di 
procedimento amministrativo e di diritto di accesso ai documenti 
amministrativi (hereinafter ‘Administrative Procedure Act’), 
Articles 22-28. Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 12 April 
2006, No 184 Regolamento recante disciplina in materia di 
accesso ai documenti amministrativi.
284 Administrative Procedure Act, art 22(1)(a).
285 Administrative documents are defined in a very broad way, 
that is “every graphical, photographical, electromagnetic 
representation (or any other kind of representation) of the 
content of documents - be they even internal or not related 
to a specific administrative procedure – which are in the 
possession of a public body and concern public interest 
activities, being immaterial the public or private nature 
of the relevant regime” (Administrative Procedure Act, 
art 22(1)(d)). For an even broader definition see Decreto del 
Presidente della Repubblica 28 December 2000, No 445 Testo 
unico delle disposizioni legislative e regolamentari in materia di 
documentazione amministrativa, art 1(1)(b).
286 Administrative Procedure Act, art 24(6)(d). See, for instance, 
Regolamento del Comune di Salerno sull’accesso agli atti e sulla 
is case law clarifying that in principle, if the right to 
access and privacy clash, the former shall prevail, at 
least in the sense that an access request will not be 
denied for privacy reasons, but the document may 
be anonymised.287 More recently and generally, it 
has been stressed that freedom of information is 
a fundamental right and, therefore, the denial to 
access requests are allowed only in exceptional 
instances.288 This approach can also be found in the 
Privacy Code289, in which there is a right to access 
administrative documents even though they contain 
personal or even sensitive data, because the freedom 
of information regime “is deemed to be of relevant 
public interest.”290 The balance is struck slightly 
differently when it comes to data on health or sexual 
life. Indeed, the access request will only be accepted 
if the interest underlying the request is a personality 
right291 or other fundamental right or freedom.292 
One may infer that normally the right to access 
prevails over opposite interests and rights, even 
in the event the opposite rights were fundamental, 
unless the computer program implementing the 
algorithm processes health data or data about the 
sexual life of the individual. Thus, it is submitted 
that also the potential clash between freedom 
of information and intellectual property should 
normally be resolved in favour of the former. The 
GDPR will not affect the balance between privacy 
and freedom of information, since the recently 
presented draft implementing decree clarified that 
access to administrative documents and civic access 
fall outside the scope of the GDPR, at least in the 
context of its Italian implementation.293
91 Only individuals who have a specific, direct, and 
actual interest in the access to the administrative 
document can exercise the right of access under 
the Administrative Procedure Act. However, in 
2016, Italy introduced a more general freedom 
of information regime. Under the Citizen Access 
Act,294 the individual has two rights. First, the right 
tutela della riservatezza dei dati contenuti in archivi e banche dati 
comunali, art 5(2)(m).
287 Consiglio di Stato, chamber V, 28 September 2007, No 4999; 
Consiglio di Stato, chamber VI, 20 April 2006, No 2223; 
Consiglio di Stato, plenary session, 18 April 2006, No 6.
288 TAR Toscana, chamber I, 10 February 2017, No 200.
289 Decreto legislativo 30 June 2003, No 196, Codice in materia di 
protezione dei dati personali (Privacy Code).
290 Privacy Code, art 59.
291 By personality rights, it is meant rights, such as life and 
honour, that are absolute and refer to fundamental aspects 
of the human being. This is a civil law notion, which 
should not be confused with the common law one, where 
personality rights are the rights to control the commercial 
use of one’s own name or other aspects of one’s identity 
(name, likeness, etc.).
292 Privacy Code, art 60.
293 Draft GDPR implementing decree, art 55.
294 Decreto legislativo 14 March 2013, No 33 Riordino della 
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to access all documents, information, and data (not 
only administrative documents), if there were an 
obligation to publish them and the relevant public 
body infringed it by not publishing.295 This right (so-
called citizen simple access) is absolute and an access 
request under this provision cannot be denied.296 
Second, a right to access documents that the State 
or other public bodies are not obliged to publish, 
justified with the purpose to “favor a generalised 
control over the pursuit of the institutional functions 
and over the use of public resources, as well as to 
promote the participation to the public debate.”297 
This citizen generalised access is a limited right.298 
Indeed, the relevant request can be denied for a 
number of reasons,299 including data protection300 
and intellectual property.301
92 There is another regime that may be used to access 
algorithms used by the State and other public 
bodies, even though its scope is very narrow. As of 
14 September 2016, under the Public Administration 
Code,302 legal and physical persons have the right to 
reuse computer programs and other “solutions” in 
order to “adapt them to their needs”.303 Therefore, 
disciplina riguardante il diritto di accesso civico e gli obblighi di 
pubblicità, trasparenza e diffusione di informazioni da parte delle 
pubbliche amministrazioni (Citizen Access Act), as amended 
by the Decreto legislativo 25 May 2016, No 97 Revisione e 
semplificazione delle disposizioni in materia di prevenzione della 
corruzione, pubblicità e trasparenza, correttivo della legge 6 
novembre 2012, n. 190 e del decreto legislativo 14 marzo 2013, n. 33, 
ai sensi dell’articolo 7 della legge 7 agosto 2015, n. 124, in materia di 
riorganizzazione delle amministrazioni pubbliche (Prevention of 
Corruption Act).
295 Citizen Access Act, art 5(1).
296 Unless the public body proves that there was no obligation 
to publish or that the document, information or data is 
already published.
297 Citizen Access Act, art 5(2).
298 Most European jurisdictions have similar provisions. In 
the UK, the Freedom of Information Act 2000, that covers 
all recorded information held by a public authority 
(Information Commissioner’s Office, Freedom of Information 
Act Awareness Guidance No. 12). However, an access may be 
denied for a number of reasons, including trade secrets and 
other commercial interests (Freedom of Information Act 
2000, Section 43). It is notable that, unlike other commercial 
interests, if the algorithm is covered by a trade secret, 
the access request may be denied without considering 
whether or not the release may cause harm (Information 
Commissioner’s Office, Freedom of Information Act Awareness 
Guidance No. 5).
299 Citizen Access Act, art 5 bis.
300 Citizen Access Act, art 5 bis (2)(a).
301 Citizen Access Act, art 5 bis (2)(c).
302 Decreto legislativo 7 March 2005, No 82 Codice 
dell’amministrazione digitale (Digital Administration Code), as 
amended by Decreto legislativo 26 August 2016, No 179 recante 
“Modifiche e integrazioni al. Codice dell’amministrazione digitale, 
di cui al decreto legislativo 7 marzo 2005, n. 82, ai sensi dell’articolo 
1 della legge 7 agosto 2015, n. 124, in materia di riorganizzazione 
delle amministrazioni pubbliche”.
303 Digital Administration Code, art 69(1).
the State or other requested public body have an 
obligation to make the relevant source code publicly 
available “alongside the documentation”304 under 
a free and open-source license. However, the 
requested body can deny access in three scenarios if 
the computer program or the solution owned by the 
State or public body were not developed “based on 
the specific indications by the public customer.”305 
The denial may be justified also by ordre public, 
national security, defence, and elections.306
93 Let us focus on the recent case that applied the 
Administrative Procedure Act in order to recognise 
the right to access the source code of the computer 
program implementing the algorithm used by the 
Ministry of Education, University and Research 
with regards to the mobility of the teaching staff; 
the algorithm had been commissioned to a private 
company (HPE Services s.r.l.). The teachers’ trade 
union claimed that they could not defend their 
members’ right with regards to the mobility 
procedures if they were not allowed to access the 
algorithm. The computer program was used to 
manage the transfer of the teaching staff between 
provinces and the outcome of the procedure was 
solely determined by the algorithm. This means 
that, should the requirements be met (personal 
data, decision with legal effect, etc.), the applicant 
may exercise the rights recognised by the GDPR with 
regards to algorithmic-decision making.307
94 In the case at hand, the applicant sought to exercise 
the right to access under the freedom of information 
regime. However, this was denied by the Ministry of 
Education for a number of reasons. Firstly, the source 
code was not an administrative document (and the 
right to access under freedom of information can be 
exercised only with administrative documents).308 
Secondly, the computer program was covered by 
copyright. The court, however, dismissed both 
arguments.
304 Digital Administration Code, art 69(1). The wording is very 
vague; it is likely to refer primarily to all the documentation 
necessary to adapt the computer program to the applicant’s 
needs.
305 Digital Administration Code, art 69(1).
306 In the UK, there is the right to access datasets for reuse and 
it is broader than the Italian regime, because it regards all 
copyright works (Freedom of Information Act 2000, s 11A).
307 Currently, in Italy, the Privacy Code does not regulate 
algorithmic decision-making. The GDPR, being a regulation 
as opposed to a directive, will play an important role in 
strongly harmonising the relevant national regimes, in 
some instances by innovatively recognising the right to be 
informed about and object to algorithmic decision-making 
(e.g. in Italy), in others by updating the existing regime (e.g. 
in the UK). As seen above, the implementing measures of 
said countries seem to partly or completely overlook the 
matter.
308 Administrative Procedure Act, art 22(1)(d).
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95 Given that, with the current development of AI and 
kindred technologies, public bodies can increasingly 
replace human procedures with algorithmic ones, 
the court held that the use of the algorithm cannot 
act as justification for restricting the scope of 
application of the freedom of information regime. 
Let us imagine what would happen if all procedures 
were handled by algorithms and the freedom-
of-information requests were not applicable to 
algorithmic documents: the said regime would still 
exist in the books, but no longer in practice.
96 The conceptual first step is recognising the existence 
of the concept of a digital administrative document. 
In a digital administrative document, an algorithm 
replaces a human agent acting on behalf of a public 
body; this is allowed only with regards to the non-
discretionary administrative activities.309 Indeed, 
non-discretionary power is compatible with the 
way computer programs work, because the latter 
can translate facts and legal data into code, thus 
bringing to an immutable conclusion through 
formalised reasoning.310 This passage of the ruling 
reinforces this paper’s argument that algorithms 
cannot replace human judges (and other decision-
makers) because interpretation is ubiquitous and it 
is an intrinsically discretionary process.
97 This said, the court needed to qualify the computer 
program itself as a digital administrative document, 
otherwise no access to the source code could be 
granted (at least under this regime). The computer 
program qualifies as a digital administrative 
document because it materialises the ultimate will 
of the public body in a way that is able to create, 
modify, or extinguish the individual’s legal positions. 
Consistently with the technology neutrality 
principle, the relevant statutory provision describes 
the ‘administrative document’ in a very broad 
way by encompassing also the electromagnetic 
representation of a document and any other form 
309 In Italy, the discretional power of the public administration 
is a fundamental principle, whereas only in a limited 
number of instances the State or other public body take 
a non-discretionary decision (with the content as well 
as the requirements rigidly predetermined by the law), 
for instance when an authorisation shall be released as a 
necessary consequence of the positive assessment of the 
existence of certain requirements. Some authors affirm 
that administrative power is always discretionary (e.g. 
Fabio Massimo Nicosia, Potere ed eccesso di potere nell’attività 
amministrativa non discrezionale (Jovene 1991), but this theory 
is not widely accepted (e.g. Paola Rossi, Il riesame degli atti di 
accertamento (Giuffrè 2008)).
310 The Italian Court of Cassation defined the digital 
administrative document in a narrow way by including 
only those documents which are directly and automatically 
processed from the computer, in as much as they do not 
require discretional assessments and argumentations linked 
to the specificities of the case at hand (Corte di Cassazione, 
chamber I, 28 December 2000, No 16204).
of representation.311 Therefore, there is no problem 
in considering a computer program implementing 
an algorithm as an administrative document (if the 
other legal requirements are also met).312 It may be 
conceded that, strictly speaking, a computer program 
is not a document in itself. However, recognising the 
right to access only to the final document resulting 
from the algorithmic procedure would equal denying 
the access request, because without the source code 
it may prove hard to understand the rationale of the 
final decision. The right to access often serve the 
purpose of lodging a complaint against a public body 
if the final decision affected the individual’s rights or 
legitimate interests. However, it is unlikely that such 
a claim would be successful, if the individual does 
not have access to the rationale of the final decision 
(which means also accessing the source code, if 
the decision is algorithmic). Indeed, it is believed 
that a narrow interpretation of an ‘administrative 
document’ would not comply with the right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial as enshrined in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU313 and 
in the European Convention of Human Rights.314
98 One may object that granting the access in this 
case would be tantamount to granting access to the 
source code of the computer program (e.g. Microsoft 
Word) used to write an administrative document. 
Such an argument would be based on a wrong 
understanding of what is a digital administrative 
document. Indeed, the court distinguishes between 
documents drafted with the aid of a computer and 
electronically programmed documents, where the 
software finds and links data and norms. The latter 
is a digital administrative document (the source code 
of which is accessible) because it constitutes the 
final decision; it is not a mere aid to draft it.315 This 
paper joins those who underline that “the electronic 
processing is the document, it represents it, it makes 
it known externally, it becomes the form of the 
document, thus being legally relevant in its electronic 
form, regardless of its paper transcription.”316 The 
311 Administrative Procedure Act, art 22(1)(d).
312 In particular, the document must be in a public body’s 
possession and it must regard public interest activities 
(Administrative Procedure Act, art 22(1)(d)). It is immaterial 
if the algorithm was developed as a consequence of contract 
(a private law tool), as long as the relevant activity is of 
public interest, which is the case here, given that the 
purpose of the program is to improve the management of a 
public service (education).
313 Art 47.
314 Art 6, art 13.
315 Contrary to what was held by the court, some scholars affirm 
that only the administrative document drafted with the aid 
of a computer is a digital administrative act. See Alfonso 
Contaldo and Luigi Marotta, ‘L’informatizzazione dell’atto 
amministrativo: cenni sulle problematiche in campo’ (2002) 
18(3) Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica 576.
316 Massimiliano Minerva, ‘L’attività amministrativa in forma 
elettronica’ (1997) 4 Foro amministrativo 1300, italics 
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very broad definition of administrative document 
is seen by the court and by legal scholars as a shift 
from a focus on the pedigree of the document, to its 
function:317 if the function is administrative (as in 
concerning the public interest), then it is immaterial 
how the document was formed and access shall be 
granted in any event, if the general requirements are 
met. This said, it is important to stress that the court 
stated that electronically programmed documents 
are not allowed when it comes to the exercise of 
discretionary power,318 due to the difficulty “which 
is scientific as opposed to legal, to map the reasoning 
underlying the document,”319 if this is the outcome 
of an algorithmic procedure (and not simply drafted 
by a human being with the aid of a word processor). 
Again, there is no place for algorithmic decisions 
where the relevant process is discretionary.320
added.
317 Carmelo Giurdanella and Elio Guarnaccia, Elementi di diritto 
amministrativo elettronico (Halley 2005) 24.
318 Most scholars agree, see e.g. Contaldo (n 312) 580.
319 TAR Lazio, chamber III bis, 22 March 2017, No 3769. This idea 
was first expressed by A Ravalli, ‘Atti amministrativi emanati 
mediante sistemi informatici: problematiche relative alla 
tutela giurisdizionale’ (1989) 2 Trib. Amm. Reg. 261. The 
traditional theory that presents a dichotomy discretionary-
non-discretionary and allows algorithmic decisions (or 
electronically processed administrative documents) only 
with regards to the latter is open to criticism. However, 
this is not because, as Ravalli thinks, even discretionary 
administrative activities are rational logical processes based 
on predetermined criteria (which is debatable). The point is 
that interpretation is always discretionary and even non-
discretionary power is exercised through interpretation 
(given that the dichotomy interpretation-application is 
untenable, as shown by Hart; see Viola (n 29) 50).
320 This passage may be interpreted as the court espousing that 
line of thought whereby the admissibility of algorithmic 
decisions (or electronically processed administrative 
documents) depends not on the nature of the power, but to 
the scientific possibility to map the reasoning underlying 
the document (Giurdanella (n 314) 32; Michele Corradino, 
‘Inquadramento generale dell’atto amministrativo 
elettronico’ (Convegno DAE 2004). However, before 
referring to the importance of the said scientific possibility 
(or the lack thereof), the court is adamant in reaffirming 
the old contraposition. Indeed, the court states that “we 
can easily agree that administrative documents which are 
the output of an algorithmic procedure are admissible 
with regards to the non-discretionary activity of the public 
bodies” (TAR Lazio, chamber III bis, 22 March 2017, No 3769). 
It then goes on to observe that “it is evident that different 
considerations apply to the discretionary activities” (ibid.). 
The reference to the fact that the admissibility of this 
kind of digital administrative act does not depend on the 
qualification of the activity as discretionary (but it would 
depend on the possibility of mapping the underlying 
reasoning) is introduced by a dubitative form (“it may be 
possible to assume that”) and it seems an obiter dictum. 
One may infer this by the observation that “we believe that 
we can disregard the exam of this very interesting legal 
question” (ibid.).
99 After recognising the right to access the computer 
program, the court went on to state that providing 
the applicant with the mere description of the 
algorithm and of its functioning is not a sufficient 
response.321 Only the access to the source code is. 
Indeed, the Ministry of Education had responded 
to the access request by describing the algorithmic 
procedure (collection of input data, appointment to 
a certain school, distribution of the results), as well 
as reporting some case studies. The court, however, 
states, “the assessment of the functionality of the 
algorithm or of programming errors can be carried 
out exclusively in light of the knowledge”322 of 
the source code. This should be accompanied by a 
thorough explanation of the rationale and of the 
consequences of the decisions, especially if personal 
data is involved.
100 Finally, as to the clash with the copyright on the 
computer program, the steps to follow are: i. 
Assessment of copyright subsistence; ii. Authorship 
and ownership; iii. Infringement; iv. Exceptions. 
101 The subsistence, authorship, and ownership of the 
copyright do not seem to be problematic.323 Even 
though there is no evidence on the point, the court 
assumes that the Ministry of Education owns the 
program under a license with HPE Services s.r.l., 
which retains authorship and the moral rights.324
102 The court goes on to observe that the purpose of 
the access does not conflict with the economic 
interest protected by copyright.325 On this point, 
the court is not clear as to whether it is dealing 
with the assessment of infringement or with the 
exceptions. In the latter event, this would be a 
peculiar ruling, because it would take a flexible 
“fair use”326-like approach to copyright exceptions, 
321 Some believe that the description of the algorithm could solve 
the problem of making the citizen understand the software 
used by the public body. See Daniele Marongiu, ‘Gli atti 
amministrativi ad elaborazione elettronica: la compilazione 
di un “pre-software” in lingua italiana’ (Quaderni del DAE 
2003) <http://www.cesda.it/quadernidae/pdf/MARONGIU_
DAE2003.pdf> accessed 1 March 2018.
322 TAR Lazio, chamber III bis, 22 March 2017, No 3769.
323 The court accepts the Ministry of Education’s allegations on 
the point, because there are no elements that may suggest 
that there is no copyright on the computer program at 
hand.
324 Transactions regarding moral rights (e.g. paternity waivers) 
are not enforceable under Italian copyright law (Legge 
22 April 1941, No 633 Legge a protezione del diritto d’autore 
e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio (Copyright Act), 
art 22).
325 In Italy, the author of a copyright work has the exclusive 
right to use the work for economic purposes (Copyright Act, 
art 12(2)).
326 This is the doctrine of copyright exceptions in the US. It 
does not revolve around a list of permitted uses, but it is 
a flexible principle that enables the judge to assess all the 
Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making
201831 1
usually interpreted by applying the so-called three-
step test, revolving around an exhaustive list of 
permitted uses.327 There is currently no copyright 
exception for non-commercial use or for purposes 
of freedom of information. The access to the 
source code for this purpose may not conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work and may not 
prejudice the interests of the author. However, the 
third step requires that the exception be expressly 
provided by the law, which currently does include 
a general exception for non-commercial acts. 
Conversely, the point should be better construed as 
meaning that there can be no infringement because 
the restricted act is not the distribution of the 
copyright work, but its distribution for commercial 
purposes. Indeed, the heading of the chapter of the 
Copyright Act on the restricted acts is “Protection 
of the economic use of the work”328 and the first 
relevant provision recognises the “exclusive right 
to economically use the work within the limits of 
the Act.”329 From this perspective, the clash between 
freedom of information and copyright is merely 
ostensible, because the right to access administrative 
documents does not interfere with the uses of 
computer programs that are restricted by the law. 
Additionally, a different conclusion would have led to 
an unacceptable difference of treatment depending 
on the technological solution adopted. It is obvious 
that, in principle, public bodies own copyright on 
the documents they produce. However, it would 
be absurd to claim that a freedom of information 
request can be denied because the public body owns 
the relevant copyright. This would equal sterilising 
the right to access. Accordingly, the discretional 
adoption of a more modern technology cannot 
justify different considerations. Therefore, just like 
copyright could never be the basis of an access denial 
under the analysed regime, it will never justify the 
access denial with regards to computer programs.
103 An argument of the Ministry of Education was, 
then, that the so-called citizen generalised access 
request can be denied if necessary to avoid an actual 
prejudice to intellectual property.330 However, the 
right to access under the Administrative Procedure 
circumstances of the case to ascertain whether the use of a 
copyright work was fair.
327 The exception must fall within the exhaustive list of the 
Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society), not conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author (art 5(5)).
328 Copyright Act, Titolo I, Capo III, Sezione I.
329 Copyright Act, art 12(2). See arts 64 bis – 64 quater for the 
specific provisions on computer programs (the general rule 
on the economic use, however, applies also to computer 
programs).
330 Citizen Access Act, Article 5 bis (2)(c).
Act (which is the one relevant here) and the citizen 
access are entirely different things. Their purposes 
are discrete. The former does not encompass a right 
to a generalised control over the public bodies:331 it 
serves the purpose to enable the individuals to defend 
their rights and interests which may be affected 
by an administrative document. This generalised 
control, conversely, is the purpose of the citizen 
access rights under the Citizen Access Act. The 
requirements of the right to access administrative 
documents and the citizen access rights (both simple 
and generalised) are different; therefore, all the 
remedies can operate in parallel. The balance will 
have to be struck differently. On the one hand, the 
former requires access to more detailed information, 
because it serves the purpose of preparing a claim. 
On the other hand, under a citizen access regime, 
even less granular information will be sufficient 
(e.g., the description of the algorithm may suffice 
under this regime). The court states that, therefore, 
it may be that whereas a citizen access is denied, it 
may be accepted with regards to the same document 
if the same individual exercises the right to access 
administrative documents.
104 It is submitted that the court may have brought into 
play three more considerations. First and foremost, 
ubi lex voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit. The lawmaker 
expressly accepts that an access request can be 
denied for intellectual property purposes under 
the citizen access regime. However, the fact that 
the legislator does not provide a similar exception 
with regards to the right to access administrative 
documents constitutes evidence of the untenability 
of an intellectual property exception to the said 
right. Second, intellectual property is mentioned 
in the citizen access regime as an example of 
“economic and commercial interests.”332 Therefore, 
since it has already been proven that the access to 
the source code would not conflict with the use of 
the program for commercial purposes, even if the 
exception were extended to the right to access 
administrative documents, it would not apply in the 
case at hand. Third, the exceptions to the citizen 
access are allowed only if “necessary to avoid an 
actual prejudice” to the listed interests (including 
intellectual property). Arguably, denying access to 
the source code may not always be necessary to avoid 
such prejudice (for instance, if the applicant agrees 
to make a non-commercial use of it). Given that there 
is no intellectual property exception to the right to 
access administrative documents, one should bear in 
mind that also trade secrets and patents might not be 
used to prevent the said access. This is particularly 
important from our perspective, given the pivotal 
331 Administrative Procedure Act, Article 24(3). See, for 
instance, Consiglio di Stato, chamber V, 25 September 2006, 
No 5636.
332 Citizen Access Act, art 5 bis (2)(c).
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role of trade secrets in keeping algorithms opaque.
105 As a consequence of the lack of the elements of 
infringement, of the inexistence of an intellectual 
property exception to the right to access 
administrative documents, as well as of the general 
assertion whereby “the nature of copyright 
work does not represent a justification for access 
denial,”333 the court recognises the right to access 
the source code, provided that the applicant uses 
the information exclusively for the purposes that 
legitimised the claim (the right of the teachers’ trade 
union to defend its members’ rights).
106 For all the reasons analysed above, the court found 
in favour of the teachers’ trade union and, therefore, 
annulled the access denial and ordered the Ministry 
of Education the release of a copy of the source 
code of the computer program implementing the 
algorithm used by the Ministry in handling the 
teachers’ mobility. 
107 The right to access administrative documents 
may be seen as a weak tool when it comes to the 
transparency of the algorithmic decisions taken by 
the State and other public bodies. Indeed, especially 
in AI / black box contexts, accessing the source code 
of the computer program implementing an algorithm 
does not provide the applicant with valuable and 
/ or intelligible information.334 However, denying 
such access would conflict with the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy, because an individual 
could hardly be successful in a claim against a 
public body, if they cannot access the rationale of 
an algorithmic decision affecting their rights and 
legitimate interests.
108 Some scholars suggest that, in the future, artificial 
intelligence will be used to adopt algorithmic 
administrative documents even when it comes to 
discretionary activity, with the possibility of leaving 
room for the human intervention in the most 
difficult cases.335 They maintain that this is only a 
prediction but given the current developments of 
natural language processing and machine learning, 
333 TAR Lazio, chamber III bis, 22 March 2017, No 3769.
334 It is not a coincidence that the applicant is not an individual, 
but a trade union, which is likely to have the resources 
to make sense of a source code. The fact that a lay person 
could hardly understand a source code has been used as an 
argument against the recognition of computer programs 
as digital administrative documents. However, the court 
points out that the choice of an innovative tool cannot 
deprive the citizens of the right to access administrative 
documents and that, anyway, the applicant may avail 
themselves of the collaboration of an IT person to decipher 
the code.
335 Giurdanella (n 314) 33, referring to Giovanni Sartor, Le 
applicazioni giuridiche dell’intelligenza artificiale (Giuffrè 1990) 
and Giovanni Sartor, ‘Gli agenti software: nuovi soggetti del 
cyberdiritto?’ (2002) Contratto e impresa 465.
arguably the relevant tools are already available. 
Even though it cannot be said that artificial 
intelligence should be banned altogether when it 
comes to discretionary power, it is believed that 
some room for ex-ante human intervention should 
always be left for a number of reasons, including 
the fact that all administrative activities (like 
all interpretive operations) are to some extent 
discretionary. This does not mean, however, that 
citizens cannot exercise the right to access under 
the freedom of information regime if the relevant 
administrative activity is non-discretionary. It 
means that public bodies are not allowed to use AI 
when they are exercising a discretionary power.
109 The question remains as to what citizens can do if 
public bodies start taking decisions against them 
even in the discretionary realm. The remedy 
described in this section operates ex post, once the 
decision has already been taken. Similarly, the 
copyright and patent exceptions may constitute a 
useful ex-post tool, but their scope is quite limited. 
From an ex-ante perspective, however, it may be 
argued that a potentially affected individual could 
obtain an injunction to prevent a public body 
from taking an algorithmic decision by using the 
data protection tool under Article 22 of the GDPR. 
Therefore, an integrated approach to the remedies 
against algorithmic decisions should be taken.
F. Conclusions
110 This study presented ten arguments against 
algorithmic decision-making, as well as three 
routes available to those affected by algorithms. As 
pointed out by some scholars,336 the most important 
thing is providing individuals with the means to 
challenge adverse algorithmic decisions. To do so, 
intellectual property, data protection, and freedom 
of information provide adequate protections, 
particularly if one takes an integrated approach. 
National implementations of the GDPR should be 
a precious opportunity to detail the procedures to 
challenge algorithmic decisions, even though it does 
not seem that this is the direction that is being taken.
111 Intellectual property enables the legitimate user 
of a software implementing an algorithm or of an 
algorithm-related patent to carry out certain acts 
(study, observation, etc.) without the intellectual 
property owner’s consent. Whilst these quasi-rights 
allow the user to try and understand the algorithm 
by themselves, they do not give them a positive 
right to demand the intellectual property owner’s 
cooperation.
336 Keats (n 4) 1.
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112 Conversely, a freedom of information request allows 
all citizens to impose upon public bodies, under 
certain circumstances, an obligation to release the 
source code of computer programs that implement 
algorithms, while explaining the logic involved in 
the relevant decision. The main shortcoming of 
this regime is the limitation to public defendants. 
Much will depend on how courts will strike a balance 
between freedom of information and intellectual 
property. In Italy, the former prevails. In turn, 
arguably, the UK tend to favour the interests of the 
intellectual property owners.
113 The only ad-hoc regime against algorithmic decisions 
is provided by art 22 of the GDPR. One may criticise 
some aspects of this provision. For instance, it 
applies only to decisions “solely based on automated 
processing” means. This paper’s suggestion is 
to recognise the right not to be subject to an 
algorithmic decision every time that there is not a 
human being taking the final decision substantially, 
as opposed to formally. In spite of its shortcomings, 
art 22 is clear and detailed in laying out the general 
principle that businesses, governments, judges, and 
other data controllers should not make decisions 
based solely on algorithmic processes. Under certain 
circumstances (e.g. explicit consent), such decisions 
can be made, but informing the data subject and 
allowing him or her to access to the logic involved 
in the decision, its significance, and the envisaged 
consequences. Much will depend on the national 
implementing measures. The UK Data Protection 
Bill risks not ensuring compliance with the GDPR, 
thus exposing the UK to the possibility of being 
considered as ‘inadequate’ in the context of cross-
border EU-UK data transfers.
114 It is submitted that only a document which includes 
both the algorithm used and an explanation of the 
logic and consequences in non-technical terms 
would comply with the GDPR as interpreted in 
light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Then, the right to a human judge is paramount, 
because the right to access and to be informed may 
prove useless. Indeed, when artificial intelligence 
is used, it is sometimes unfeasible to access the 
relevant rationale. To the legal black box created 
by intellectual property rights, one needs to add the 
technical black box and the organisational one.
115 Practically, if the algorithmic decision is based on 
personal data, this latter route is preferable. If not 
and the decision-maker is a public body, one should 
opt for a freedom of information request. If a private 
decision-maker (e.g. a bank) makes an algorithmic 
decision based on non-personal data, then the route 
will be that of intellectual property exceptions. The 
freedom-of-information remedies operate ex post, 
once the decision has already been taken. In turn, 
the copyright and patent exceptions may be used 
before any decision is made, but only to access the 
algorithm, not to prevent the decision-maker from 
proceeding algorithmically. The only regime that 
prevents algorithmic decisions is the one provided 
by the GDPR.
116 The trust in artificial intelligence and algorithms 
derives from the belief that non-human agents 
are unbiased, and their decisions are not affected 
by passions and ideologies. In fact, algorithms are 
as biased as the people who trained them, but in a 
less transparent and accountable way. The more 
important algorithms will become, the more we will 
want them to embed our values (and, therefore, our 
ideologies and biases).337 Further research should 
be carried out by diverse (also in terms of gender, 
ethnicity, etc.) multidisciplinary teams in order to 
find solutions to open the technical, organisation, 
and legal black boxes and to ensure fair algorithmic 
decision-making. Indeed, only a strong humanist 
stance will be able to reduce algorithmic bias.
117 This paper is a humanist manifesto. It is, indeed, 
permeated with the belief that we should trust our 
fellow human beings over the algorithms, despite 
developments in artificial intelligence allowing the 
deployment of increasingly refined legal applications. 
This does not mean that we should reject the use of 
algorithms altogether. For instance, judges shall use 
them to improve the quality and consistency of their 
decisions. However, they shall not let algorithms 
decide in their stead. In order to better understand 
how to make the human-algorithm cooperation work 
best, it has become crucial to shift the focus from the 
definition of algorithms, artificial intelligence etc. 
to the understanding of what makes us human.338
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